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Seller: Michener & Rutledge Booksellers, Inc., Baldwin City, KS, U.S.A.
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Seller: Grand Eagle Retail, Fairfield, OH, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty usually require compromise. Yet national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. Why do legislators reject such agreements? This engaging and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise - and exacerbate gridlock - because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and also overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior. This investigation of national, state, and local legislators tackles a pressing problem: the gridlock arising from politicians rejecting compromise for fear of punishment from voters in primary elections. Examining legislative behavior and possible negotiation reforms, this book will interest scholars and students studying polarization, Congress, American politics, and public policy. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781108487955
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Seller: Revaluation Books, Exeter, United Kingdom
Hardcover. Condition: Brand New. 172 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. Seller Inventory # __1108487955
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Seller: Buchpark, Trebbin, Germany
Condition: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut - Gepflegter, sauberer Zustand. | Seiten: 182 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher. Seller Inventory # 36095182/2
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Gebunden. Condition: New. This investigation of national, state, and local legislators tackles a pressing problem: the gridlock arising from politicians rejecting compromise for fear of punishment from voters in primary elections. Examining legislative behavior and possible negotiat. Seller Inventory # 351276557
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Seller: AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, Australia
Hardcover. Condition: new. Hardcover. Legislative solutions to pressing problems like balancing the budget, climate change, and poverty usually require compromise. Yet national, state, and local legislators often reject compromise proposals that would move policy in their preferred direction. Why do legislators reject such agreements? This engaging and relevant investigation into how politicians think reveals that legislators refuse compromise - and exacerbate gridlock - because they fear punishment from voters in primary elections. Prioritizing these electoral interests can lead lawmakers to act in ways that hurt their policy interests and also overlook the broader electorate's preferences by representing only a subset of voters with rigid positions. With their solution-oriented approach, Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong demonstrate that improving the likelihood of legislative compromise may require moving negotiations outside of the public spotlight. Highlighting key electoral motives underlying polarization, this book is an excellent resource for scholars and students studying Congress, American politics, public policy, and political behavior. This investigation of national, state, and local legislators tackles a pressing problem: the gridlock arising from politicians rejecting compromise for fear of punishment from voters in primary elections. Examining legislative behavior and possible negotiation reforms, this book will interest scholars and students studying polarization, Congress, American politics, and public policy. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9781108487955
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