World War II Infantry Tactics: Squad and Platoon (Elite, 105) - Softcover

Bull, Stephen

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1841766623 ISBN 13: 9781841766621

Publisher: Osprey Publishing, 2004

Synopsis

Osprey's study of infantry tactics of the squads and platoons of World War II (1939-1945). Despite all technological advances, final mastery of any battlefield depends upon the tight-knit group of footsoldiers trained to manoeuvre, shoot and dig in. This first of a two-part study examines the methods by which the Western infantry of World War II - the German, British and US armies - actually brought their firepower to bear. Drawing upon period training manuals for the evolving theory, and on personal memoirs for the individual practice, this first book covers the organization and tactics of the squad of ten or a dozen men, and the platoon of three or four squads. The text is illustrated with contemporary photographs and diagrams, and with colour plates bringing to life the movement of soldiers on the battlefield.

About this title

About the Authors

Dr Stephen Bull worked for the National Army Museum and BBC in London before taking up his current post as Curator of Military History and Archaeology with Lancashire Museums. A consultant to the University of Oxford he is also a Member of the Institute for Archaeologists, and has made TV appearances that include the series Battlefield Detectives, news and archaeology features. Published on both sides of the Atlantic and in several languages, he is the author of a number of works for Osprey including titles on tactics in World War II. Dr Bull has been one of the key contributors to the accompanying television series screened in the United Kingdom and North America.

MIKE CHAPPELL comes from an Aldershot family with British Army connections stretching back several generations. He enlisted as a teenage private in the Royal Hampshire Regiment in 1952 and retired in 1974, as RSM of the 1st Battalion The Wessex Regiment (Rifle Volunteers), after seeing service in Malaya, Cyprus, Swaziland, Libya, Germany, Ulster and home garrisons. He began painting military subjects in 1968 and has gained worldwide popularity as a military illustrator. Mike has written and illustrated many books for Osprey.

BRIAN DELF began his career producing artwork for advertising and commercial publications. Since 1972, he has worked as a freelance illustrator on a variety of subjects, and books which he has illustrated have been published in more than 30 countries.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

An extract from Squad Tactics Offensive

Basic American squad formations as described in the Rifle Company manual of 1942 were remarkably similar to the German equivalents. The US squad column saw the squad strung out, with the leader and BAR man to the fore, and the remainder in file to the rear to a length of roughly 60 paces. Such a formation was easily controlled and manoeuvred , and suitable for crossing areas exposed to artillery fire, for utilising narrow covered routes, and for movement in woods, fog, smoke, and darkness .

The skirmish line was similar to the Schützenkette. The squad was deployed in a rough line about 60 paces long; the skirmish line was of benefit in bringing all weapons to bear, and useful for short rapid dashes, but not so easy to control. An alternative was the squad wedge , suitable for ready movement in any direction and when emerging from cover or a defile. More vulnerable than a skirmish line, wedges were best used beyond the range of effective rifle fire. Once under fire the US squad was taught to advance either by short rushes, or by creep and crawl , taking advantage of cover. Although it may only rarely have been practicable, a detailed scheme of fire distribution formed part of squad training for the fire fight:

Each member of the squad fires his first shot on that portion of the target corresponding generally to his position in the squad. He then distributes his next shots right and left of his first shots, covering that part of the target on which he can deliver accurate fire without having to change position. The amount of the target which one man can cover will depend upon the range and position of the firer. Frequently each man will be able to cover the target with accurate fire; this should be done whenever possible. Fire is not limited to points within the target known to contain an enemy; on the contrary, all men space their shots so that no portion of the target remains unhit. Automatic riflemen fire bursts of about five rounds at the slow cyclic rate (in about one second). This method of fire distribution is employed without command. The squad leader observes the fire to insure that the entire target is kept under fire. If other targets appear, he announces such changes in fire distribution as are necessary.

Even if the niceties were ignored, the implication is inescapable: the US infantryman was taught to treat the enemy position as an area target, to be evenly filled with lead whether or not specific individuals could be seen and hit. Frequently this is exactly what was done; it was definitely no mere theory . A letter of instruction issued in April 1944 by Gen Patton to his unit commanders in US Third Army specifically stated that If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot the place where he is apt to be. According to Patton s opinion fire was better aimed short than long in cases of doubt, since ricochets make nastier sounds and wounds .

For the textbook attack, US squad leaders were enjoined to give specific orders to individuals and as much information as possible about what was intended. The squad would then move forward, fire and movement being employed when fire action became necessary to cover the advance. At the first firing position the squad attempted to gain superiority of fire over the enemy this being achieved by subjecting the enemy to fire of such accuracy and intensity that his fire becomes inaccurate or so reduced in volume as to be ineffective . In order to maintain this superiority it would often be necessary for some squad members to remain in position, putting down large volumes of fire, while others moved forward to new positions, from which they in turn would take up the fire fight. Suitable cover, including rises and depressions, could allow short moves at small hazard, but open areas would need longer rushes prepared by commensurately greater applications of fire. The BAR man was best placed to support the advance from a flank, husbanding his fire to the needs of the situation so as not to exhaust his ammunition prematurely.

Again, Patton s Third Army instructions of 1944 had an even more aggressive tone, and encouraged even heavier use of fire. It was to be seen as integral to movement: Infantry must move in order to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move. Moreover, marching fire was to be encouraged as the infantry went in, since it increased confidence and unsettled the enemy. To halt under fire is folly. To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward under fire.

Edition details

• Publisher: Osprey Publishing
• Publication date: 2004
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1841766623
• ISBN 13: 9781841766621
• Binding: Paperback
• Illustrator: Chappell Mike, Delf Brian
• Number of pages: 64