The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed - Softcover

Aspinall, Edward ; Crouch, Harold

9781932728002: The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1932728007 ISBN 13: 9781932728002

Publisher: East-West Center Washington, 2003

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This paper presents a preliminary analysis of the history and dynamics of Aceh's abortive peace process conducted between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. After surveying the origins and progress of the negotiations, the paper examines the roles played by the main players, the problems encountered along the way, and the achievements that were registered. Currently the peace process has broken down because the two parties have been unable to agree on the fundamental issue dividing them: whether Aceh would become an independent nation or remain an integral part of the Indonesian state. This essay explains the reasons for the failure of the process with the hope that the lessons learned may be of relevance to policymakers, analysts, and others with an interest in the long-term resolution of the Aceh conflict as well as other internal disputes in the region and beyond. It also suggests that the Indonesian government's current resort to a military solution is not only unlikely to resolve the conflict but may ultimately be counterproductive. Eventually a return to negotiations – not necessarily with GAM alone – will be necessary.

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About the Author

Edward Aspinall is a lecturer in the Department of History and the Department of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Sydney.

Harold Crouch is a professor in the Department of Political and Social Change, the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University.

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Executive Summary:

This paper presents a preliminary analysis of the history and dynamics of Aceh's abortive peace process. We survey the origins and progress of the negotiations, the roles played by the main players, the problems encountered along the way, and the achievements that were registered. Above all, our concern is to understand the reason for the failure of the process in the hope that the lessons learned may be of relevance to policymakers, analysts, and others with an interest in the long-term resolution of the Aceh conflict as well as other internal disputes in the region and beyond.

The failure of the final round of talks between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in May 2003 ended a process that had its roots in the collapse of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in May 1998 and the subsequent election of Abdurrahman Wahid to the Indonesian presidency in October 1999. These events opened the way for dialogue between President Abdurrahman's government and GAM's leadership-in-exile in Sweden. In May 2000, a cease-fire agreement of sorts was reached but it soon broke down. Contact between the two sides was not entirely severed, however, and following Abdurrahman's replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001, a new round of talks opened and eventually resulted in a "cessation of hostilities" agreement in December 2002. This agreement was welcomed with much enthusiasn not only in Aceh but internationally, although all parties knew it was just one step toward the overall resolution of the conflict. The pact provided for internationally monitored demilitarization of the territory to be followed by a dialogue "reflecting the views of all elements" of Acehnese society and finally "a free and fair electoral process." Although the agreement led to a sharp decline in armed conflict, the peace process did not proceed smoothly. When GAM refused to compromise on its demand for independence, the Indonesian military began to undermine the agreement by encouraging demonstrations against the international monitors and making preparations for a renewed military campaign. Then the Indonesian government presented an ultimatum that GAM rejected at a final meeting in Tokyo on May 18, 2003. At midnight the government declared a military emergency in Aceh and military operations commenced soon after. There seems to be little prospect of an early renewal of talks.

The peace process broke down because the two parties were unable to agree on the fundamental issue dividing them: whether Aceh would become an independent nation or remain an integral part of the Indonesian state. Leaders in Jakarta were determined to maintain Indonesia's territorial integrity and prevent "national disintegration." But GAM leaders were equally adamant that Aceh had an incontrovertible right to independence. The strategy of the peace process, as conceived by its Geneva-based mediator, was to bridge the gap between the two sides by shifting the focus away from incompatible goals toward more immediate concerns such as reduction in hostilities, disarmament, reconstruction, and the like. It was hoped that the two sides would be able to develop greater confidence in one another and perhaps eventually come up with unexpected and creative means to resolve the underlying political difference. In other words: the idea was to develop a political framework for resolving! the conflict by peaceful rather than violent means.

Reality proved to be very different. Not only were the two sides rarely able to put aside their difference over first principles, but neither evinced an unreserved commitment to the peace process as the primary means for resolving the conflict. Although the peace process was initiated by the Indonesian government, significant Indonesian groups were either profoundly ambivalent or openly hostile whereas GAM leaders never lost sight of their ultimate goal of independence. Both sides viewed the process primarily in tactical terms - as a means to undermine their opponents, force their surrender, or gain some other short-term advantage. Far from building trust, the process served ultimately to entrench the positions of the two sides and deepen the division between them.

Even so, we conclude that the Indonesian govermnent's current resort to a military solution is unlikely to resolve the conflict and may ultimately prove counterproductive. Moreover, "special autonomy" is unlikely to satisfy Acehnese aspirations unless accompanied by major economic and political reforms. Eventually a return to negotiations - not necessarily with GAM alone - will be necessary. In drawing lessons from the achievements and failings of the 2000-03 peace process, we draw particular attention to the unrealistic expectations for rapid progress toward a "final" solution. Rather than seek an immediate resolution it might have been better to concentrate, as proposed by the mediator, on preserving the "cessation of hostilitites" and maintaining peaceful conditions. A "delayed settlement" approach may have been preferable - postposting substantive discussions about the ultimate political status of Aceh while offering GAM incentives to abandon its armed struggle and participate in conventional political activities. Such a delay would also have given the central government time to improve its own image among Acehnese. To achieve such an outcome in the future, however, both sides will need to recognize that their military options are truly exhausted.

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