The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order - Softcover

Diesen, Glenn

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1949762955 ISBN 13: 9781949762952

Publisher: Clarity Press, 2024

Synopsis

Five hundred years of Western hegemony has ended, while the global majority’s aspiration for a world order based on multipolarity and sovereign equality is rising. This incisive book addresses the demise of liberal hegemony, though pointing out that a multipolar Westphalian world order has not yet taken shape, leaving the world in a period of interregnum. A legal vacuum has emerged, in which the conflicting sides are competing to define the future order.

NATO expansionism was an important component of liberal hegemony as it was intended to cement the collective hegemony of the West as the foundation for a liberal democratic peace. Instead, it dismantled the pan-European security architecture and set Europe on the path to war without the possibility of a course correction. Ukraine as a divided country in a divided Europe has been a crucial pawn in the great power competition between NATO and Russia for the past three decades.

The war in Ukraine is a symptom of the collapsing world order. The war revealed the dysfunction of liberal hegemony in terms of both power and legitimacy, and it sparked a proxy war between the West and Russia instead of ensuring peace, the source of its legitimacy.
The proxy war, unprecedented sanctions, and efforts to isolate Russia in the wider world contributed to the demise of liberal hegemony as opposed to its revival. Much of the world responded to the war by intensifying their transition to a Eurasian world order that rejects hegemony and liberal universalism. The economic architecture is being reorganised as the world diversifies away from excessive reliance on Western technologies, industries, transportation corridors, banks, payment systems, insurance systems, and currencies. Universalism based on Western values is replaced by civilisational distinctiveness, sovereign inequality is swapped with sovereign equality, socialising inferiors is replaced by negotiations, and the rules-based international order is discarded in favour of international law. A Westphalian world order is reasserting itself, although with Eurasian characteristics.

The West’s defeat of Russia would restore the unipolar world order while a Russian victory would cement a multipolar one. The international system is now at its most dangerous as the prospect of compromise is absent, meaning the winner will take all. Both NATO under US direction and Russia are therefore prepared to take great risks and escalate, making nuclear wan increasingly likely.

About this title

About the Author

Glenn Diesen is a professor at the University of Southeast Norway (USN) and an associate editor at the Russia in Global Affairs journal. Diesen’s research focus is Russia’s transition from the Greater European Initiative to the Greater Eurasian Partnership. Diesen has previously published nine books, a multitude of journal articles, and is a frequent contributor to international media. Recent titles include: The Return of Eurasia. Palgrave Macmillan with Alexander Lukin and The Think Tank Racket (Clarity Press).

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

A Neo-Containment Strategy
Jack Matlock, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987-1991 who contributed to negotiating an end to the Cold War, warned that false narratives emerged in Washington to facilitate global primacy. Matlock notes that the public was told that the purpose of NATO was to eliminate the dividing lines in Europe; however, these divisions were already gone. Matlock cautioned: “expanding the military organization that had maintained a defensive line in the middle of the continent was a good way to revive the division”. Instead of fulfilling the commitment to establish an inclusive European security architecture, Matlock argued that Washington repeated the mistake made at Versailles in 1919 by excluding Russia and establishing a security order that would perpetuate the weakness of Russia.
Irrespective of its rhetoric about expanding the zone of peace and stability, NATO also prepared for a possible conflict with Russia. Defenders of Clinton’s decision to expand the military bloc continuously referred to an expanded NATO as a “hedge” or “insurance policy” against a possible conflict with Russia in the future. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained in April 1997: “On the off-chance that in fact Russia doesn’t work out the way that we are hoping it will… NATO is there”. What Yeltsin heard was that his alleged partners in Washington had taken out an insurance policy to ensure victory over Russia if relations would deteriorate. In January 1994, prior to deciding to expand NATO, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Clinton’s top Russia adviser Strobe Talbott argued that NATO expansion would facilitate the containment of Russia. The justification of NATO’s post-Cold War existence was therefore to respond to the security threats that had been created by its expansion.
Former US Secretary of State James Baker warned that the purported need for an insurance policy could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Baker noted that proponents of NATO expansionism desired a favourable position in case Russia would in the future regard its own expansion as the best response to threats, yet NATO expansion would then realise this threat and encourage Russia to assert control over its neighbourhood. Criticising the revival of containing Russia, Baker stated the obvious: “the best way to find an enemy is to look for one, and I worry that that is what we are doing when we try to isolate Russia”.

Edition details

• Publisher: Clarity Press
• Publication date: 2024
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1949762955
• ISBN 13: 9781949762952
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 324