Why the Brain Does Not Produce Consciousness
Scientific Explanation and the Ontological Status of Experience
T-Reality Series — Vol. 5
Ontological Domain
Philosophy of Mind and Neurophilosophy
Why the Brain Does Not Produce Consciousness is a rigorous work in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy addressing the ontological problem of conscious experience in light of contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science.
Neuroscience has identified increasingly precise correlations between observable physical configurations and experiential states. However, empirical correlation does not constitute ontological explanation. This volume clarifies the ontological meaning of scientifically observed physical configurations by distinguishing between empirically accessible implementational configurations and the ontological conditions of their accessibility.
Positioned within contemporary debates on consciousness, the book engages:
• David J. Chalmers and the hard problem of consciousness
• Thomas Metzinger’s Self-Model Theory
• Predictive processing frameworks developed by Karl Friston, Andy Clark, and Jakob Hohwy
• Philosophical analyses by Jaegwon Kim
• Enactive and phenomenological perspectives advanced by Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela
Through a systematic ontological analysis, the volume demonstrates that physical configurations function as operational constraints and implementational structures for the stabilization of experience, yet cannot be identified with the ontological ground of consciousness itself.
This book is intended for:
• Scholars of philosophy of mind
• Researchers in theoretical neuroscience
• Students of cognitive science
• Readers engaged in contemporary consciousness studies
• Academics working in neurophilosophy
• Those interested in ontology of mind and experience
As the concluding volume of the Ontological Domain within the T-Reality Series, it provides the theoretical groundwork for the next phase of the project.
"synopsis" may belong to another edition of this title.
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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Why the Brain Does Not Produce ConsciousnessScientific Explanation and the Ontological Status of ExperienceT-Reality Series - Vol. 5Ontological DomainPhilosophy of Mind and NeurophilosophyWhy the Brain Does Not Produce Consciousness is a rigorous work in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy addressing the ontological problem of conscious experience in light of contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science.Neuroscience has identified increasingly precise correlations between observable physical configurations and experiential states. However, empirical correlation does not constitute ontological explanation. This volume clarifies the ontological meaning of scientifically observed physical configurations by distinguishing between empirically accessible implementational configurations and the ontological conditions of their accessibility.Positioned within contemporary debates on consciousness, the book engages: - David J. Chalmers and the hard problem of consciousness- Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory- Predictive processing frameworks developed by Karl Friston, Andy Clark, and Jakob Hohwy- Philosophical analyses by Jaegwon Kim- Enactive and phenomenological perspectives advanced by Evan Thompson and Francisco VarelaThrough a systematic ontological analysis, the volume demonstrates that physical configurations function as operational constraints and implementational structures for the stabilization of experience, yet cannot be identified with the ontological ground of consciousness itself.This book is intended for: - Scholars of philosophy of mind- Researchers in theoretical neuroscience- Students of cognitive science- Readers engaged in contemporary consciousness studies- Academics working in neurophilosophy- Those interested in ontology of mind and experienceAs the concluding volume of the Ontological Domain within the T-Reality Series, it provides the theoretical groundwork for the next phase of the project. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9798257094163
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Taschenbuch. Condition: Neu. Neuware - Why the Brain Does Not Produce ConsciousnessScientific Explanation and the Ontological Status of ExperienceT-Reality Series - Vol. 5Ontological DomainPhilosophy of Mind and NeurophilosophyWhy the Brain Does Not Produce Consciousness is a rigorous work in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy addressing the ontological problem of conscious experience in light of contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science.Neuroscience has identified increasingly precise correlations between observable physical configurations and experiential states. However, empirical correlation does not constitute ontological explanation. This volume clarifies the ontological meaning of scientifically observed physical configurations by distinguishing between empirically accessible implementational configurations and the ontological conditions of their accessibility.Positioned within contemporary debates on consciousness, the book engages: - David J. Chalmers and the hard problem of consciousness- Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory- Predictive processing frameworks developed by Karl Friston, Andy Clark, and Jakob Hohwy- Philosophical analyses by Jaegwon Kim- Enactive and phenomenological perspectives advanced by Evan Thompson and Francisco VarelaThrough a systematic ontological analysis, the volume demonstrates that physical configurations function as operational constraints and implementational structures for the stabilization of experience, yet cannot be identified with the ontological ground of consciousness itself.This book is intended for: - Scholars of philosophy of mind- Researchers in theoretical neuroscience- Students of cognitive science- Readers engaged in contemporary consciousness studies- Academics working in neurophilosophy- Those interested in ontology of mind and experienceAs the concluding volume of the Ontological Domain within the T-Reality Series, it provides the theoretical groundwork for the next phase of the project. Seller Inventory # 9798257094163
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Paperback. Condition: new. Paperback. Why the Brain Does Not Produce ConsciousnessScientific Explanation and the Ontological Status of ExperienceT-Reality Series - Vol. 5Ontological DomainPhilosophy of Mind and NeurophilosophyWhy the Brain Does Not Produce Consciousness is a rigorous work in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy addressing the ontological problem of conscious experience in light of contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science.Neuroscience has identified increasingly precise correlations between observable physical configurations and experiential states. However, empirical correlation does not constitute ontological explanation. This volume clarifies the ontological meaning of scientifically observed physical configurations by distinguishing between empirically accessible implementational configurations and the ontological conditions of their accessibility.Positioned within contemporary debates on consciousness, the book engages: - David J. Chalmers and the hard problem of consciousness- Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory- Predictive processing frameworks developed by Karl Friston, Andy Clark, and Jakob Hohwy- Philosophical analyses by Jaegwon Kim- Enactive and phenomenological perspectives advanced by Evan Thompson and Francisco VarelaThrough a systematic ontological analysis, the volume demonstrates that physical configurations function as operational constraints and implementational structures for the stabilization of experience, yet cannot be identified with the ontological ground of consciousness itself.This book is intended for: - Scholars of philosophy of mind- Researchers in theoretical neuroscience- Students of cognitive science- Readers engaged in contemporary consciousness studies- Academics working in neurophilosophy- Those interested in ontology of mind and experienceAs the concluding volume of the Ontological Domain within the T-Reality Series, it provides the theoretical groundwork for the next phase of the project. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Seller Inventory # 9798257094163
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