Abduction, Reason and Science. Processes of Discovery and Explanation

Magnani, Lorenzo

ISBN 10: 0306465140 / ISBN 13: 9780306465147

Published by Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2001

About this Item

xvii + 205 pp. Rubber-stamped on front free endpaper.

Seller Inventory # 32715

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Abduction, Reason and Science. Processes of Discovery and Explanation
• Publisher: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York
• Publication Date: 2001
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0306465140
• ISBN 13: 9780306465147
• Binding: Hardback
• Condition: Very Good
• Book Type: book
• Seller catalogs:
  • Science

About this title

Synopsis

This volume explores abduction (inference to explanatory hypotheses), an important but neglected topic in scientific reasoning. My aim is to inte­ grate philosophical, cognitive, and computational issues, while also discuss­ ing some cases of reasoning in science and medicine. The main thesis is that abduction is a significant kind of scientific reasoning, helpful in delineating the first principles of a new theory of science. The status of abduction is very controversial. When dealing with abduc­ tive reasoning misinterpretations and equivocations are common. What are the differences between abduction and induction? What are the differences between abduction and the well-known hypothetico-deductive method? What did Peirce mean when he considered abduction a kind of inference? Does abduction involve only the generation of hypotheses or their evaluation too? Are the criteria for the best explanation in abductive reasoning epis­ temic, or pragmatic, or both? How many kinds of abduction are there? The book aims to increase knowledge about creative and expert infer­ ences. The study of these high-level methods of abductive reasoning is situ­ ated at the crossroads of philosophy, epistemology, artificial intel1igence, cognitive psychology, and logic; that is, at the heart of cognitive science. Philosophers of science in the twentieth century have traditionally distin­ guished between the inferential processes active in the logic of discovery and the ones active in logic of justification.