The Acquirer and the Performance of Targets in Partial Acquisitions

Stanko Racic

ISBN 10: 365930316X / ISBN 13: 9783659303166

Published by LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Mai 2013, 2013

About this Item

This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Determinants of the value of acquired firms were further examined by analyzing the effect of corporate governance and other characteristics of Japanese and US acquirers on the long-term performance of their US targets during period when both US and Japanese economies experienced superior and poor performances. Bidder-target relationship in general and the role of unique Japanese characteristics (keiretsu, cross-holding, ties to a main bank, negligible shareholding, latitude and long-term focus of managers) were studied. The debate whether unique characteristics of the Japanese governance system make it more efficient than market based one in the US, or lead to greater agency problem, developed in the early 1990s following the slowdown in the US and boom in the Japanese economy. In this study better managed bidders, regardless of country of origin, with more resources were found to positively affect the performance of smaller targets in related industries. The mixed results for the Japanese governance variables, predicted positive for the main bank and unexpected negative for the keiretsu and cross-holding, do not allow a clear-cut answer as to which governance system is dominant. 136 pp. Englisch.

Seller Inventory # 9783659303166

Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Acquirer and the Performance of Targets in Partial Acquisitions
• Publisher: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Mai 2013
• Publication Date: 2013
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 365930316X
• ISBN 13: 9783659303166
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 220W x 150H x 9D millimeters 220 millimeters width by 150 millimeters height by 9 millimeters depth
• Weight: 221 grams

About this title

Synopsis

Determinants of the value of acquired firms were further examined by analyzing the effect of corporate governance and other characteristics of Japanese and US acquirers on the long-term performance of their US targets during period when both US and Japanese economies experienced superior and poor performances. Bidder–target relationship in general and the role of unique Japanese characteristics (keiretsu, cross-holding, ties to a main bank, negligible shareholding, latitude and long-term focus of managers) were studied. The debate whether unique characteristics of the Japanese governance system make it more efficient than market based one in the US, or lead to greater agency problem, developed in the early 1990s following the slowdown in the US and boom in the Japanese economy. In this study better managed bidders, regardless of country of origin, with more resources were found to positively affect the performance of smaller targets in related industries. The mixed results for the Japanese governance variables, predicted positive for the main bank and unexpected negative for the keiretsu and cross-holding, do not allow a clear-cut answer as to which governance system is dominant.

About the Author

Stanko Racic, PhD: Katz Graduate School of Business at University of Pittsburgh. Associate Professor of Finance at Robert Morris University's School of Business. His work was presented and published in proceedings of numerous academic conferences and published in academic journals including Journal of Financial Economics.