Aggregation and Representation of Preferences: Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy

S. Tanguiane, Andranick:

ISBN 10: 0387538453 / ISBN 13: 9780387538457

Published by Springer-Verlag, 1991

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Sofort verfügbar Versand am folgenden Arbeitstag mit Rechnung daily shipping wordwide with invoice ex library aus Bibliothek Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.

Seller Inventory # 134367

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Aggregation and Representation of Preferences: Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy
• Publisher: Springer-Verlag
• Publication Date: 1991
• Language: German
• ISBN 10: 0387538453
• ISBN 13: 9780387538457
• Binding: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Condition: Sehr gut
• Weight: 550 grams
• Seller catalogs:
  • Alle Bücher

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Synopsis

Aggregation is the conjunction of information, aimed at its compact represen­ tation. Any time when the totality of data is described in terms of general­ ized indicators, conventional counts, typical representatives and characteristic dependences, one directly or indirectly deals with aggregation. It includes revealing the most significant characteristics and distinctive features, quanti­ tative and qualitative analysis. As a result, the information becomes adaptable for further processing and convenient for human perception. Aggregation is widely used in economics, statistics, management, planning, system analysis, and many other fields. That is why aggregation is so important in data pro­ cessing. Aggregation of preferences is a particular case of the general problem of ag­ gregation. It arises in multicriteria decision-making and collective choice, when a set of alternatives has to be ordered with respect to contradicting criteria, or various individual opinions. However, in spite of apparent similarity the problems of multicriteria decision-making and collective choice are somewhat different. Indeed, an improvement in some specifications at the cost of worsen­ ing others is not the same as the satisfaction of interests of some individuals to the prejudice of the rest. In the former case the reciprocal compensations are considered within a certain entirety; in the latter we infringe upon the rights of independent individuals. Moreover, in multicriteria decision-making one usu­ ally takes into account objective factors, whereas in collective choice one has to compare subjective opinions which cannot be measured properly.