Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important? (Classic Reprint)

Max H. Bazerman, Henry S. Farber

ISBN 10: 1332251943 / ISBN 13: 9781332251940

Published by Forgotten Books, 2018

About this Item

Print on Demand. This book analyzes the decision-making processes of arbitrators in conventional interest arbitration, a common method for settling labor disputes when negotiations fail. The author argues that the current critique of conventional arbitration, which has led to the adoption of final-offer arbitration, is flawed. Arbitrators are not simply splitting the difference between the offers of the parties or basing their decisions solely on the facts of the case. Instead, they consider both the facts and the offers, with the relative weight given to each varying depending on the quality of the offers. This has important implications for the collective bargaining process, as it suggests that the parties can influence the arbitration award through manipulation of their offers. The author's findings provide a more nuanced understanding of the role of arbitrators in labor disputes and highlight the importance of considering the decision-making process when evaluating arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book.

Seller Inventory # 9781332251940_0

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important? (Classic Reprint)
• Publisher: Forgotten Books
• Publication Date: 2018
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1332251943
• ISBN 13: 9781332251940
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: New
• Book Type: print-on-demand item
• Seller catalogs:
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About this title

Synopsis

How final offers shape arbitration outcomes and bargaining dynamics

This concise analysis examines how arbitrators weigh the facts of a case against the offers of the parties. It explores when an arbitrator may rely on “splitting the difference” and when the quality of offers shifts the balance toward a fact-based decision. The study uses a controlled simulation to separate the influence of offers from case facts, revealing how different models perform in predicting awards.

• Learn how arbitrators balance case facts with the parties’ offers in wage disputes.
• See why the relative weight given to offers can change as offers diverge or converge.
• Understand why simple “split-the-difference” models may fail to capture real arbitration behavior.
• Discover how offer quality and case specifics interact to shape final awards.

Ideal for readers of labor relations, negotiation, and decision-making in arbitration, this edition clarifies how final offers impact settlements and why understanding these dynamics matters.

About the Author

Max H. Bazerman is the Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. He is the author and coauthor of many books, including Negotiation Genius.