US Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year

This volume describes the initial direction and strategy of the first major though limited war that the United States was to fight on the continent of Asia in the era of global tension that followed World War II. There are marked similarities as well as some basic differences between the war in Korea and the war that would follow a decade later in Southeast Asia, and certainly the study of both is necessary to understand the limitations on armed conflict under the shadow of nuclear holocaust. One can also discern in this volume the importance of individuals in altering the course of human events and the fate of nations, the wider concerns that preclude the massing by a world power of its military strength in one direction, and many other facets of the nation's recent military history it behooves all thoughtful Americans to ponder. Colonel Schnabel's work is the third to appear in a planned 5-volume history of the United States Army in the Korean War. It complements the detailed account of operations from June to November 1950, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, published in 1961, and the sequel to it still in preparation that will cover tactical operations through June 1951. The volume entitled Truce Tent and Fighting Front, published in 1966, covers the last two years of the war, and a logistical history of the Korean conflict is also scheduled to appear. Both military and civilian students and the scholarly reading public should find in this book much that is illuminating and provocative of reflection, and not only about events that happened more than two decades ago. James L. Collins, Jr. Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History