Assets Forfeiture: A Study of Policy and Its Practice

The desire to generate revenue from the sale of illegal drugs has produced a complex system of fines and forfeiture statutes that seek to deprive drug traffickers of the financial incentive for engaging in the manufacture and sale of drugs and to generate revenue from drug trafficking. As a result, the purpose of drug enforcement may be confusing to the players. That is, it is possible that the primary goal of drug enforcement may come to be oriented toward the production of maximum revenue rather than toward the minimum reduction in illicit drug flow. As such, the provisions of recent forfeiture legislation may have enhanced this potential.

In Assets Forfeiture, Vecchi and Sigler address the potential for abuse of assets forfeiture. They identify bureaucracy as an insulator against corruption and investigate assets forfeiture as a revenue generator for federal, state, and local governments. The book also discusses the potential dichotomy of public policy between the upper levels of law enforcement agency management and its lower echelons of the officers on the street.

Gregory Vecchi is an FBI agent in Miami, Florida, and he is pursuing his Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

Before his retirement, Robert Sigler was a Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Alabama.