Autonomy and Rights: The Moral Foundations of Liberalism

Moral and political theorists who espouse Egalitarianism and Marxism have assumed that the tenets of classical liberalism lack a sound philosophical justification. Spector contests this view, and puts forward an original justification theory for the liberal belief in the existence of human rights that constrain government action. His theory is centered in the deontological protection of positive freedom: each human being should have the power to choose between as many alternative actions as possible. The author argues that it is possible to construct a theory about the rational way to protect this right. Among the topics discussed are the concepts of negative and positive freedom, the notion of a moral right, the connection between positive freedom and personal autonomy, the axiological uniqueness of each human being, and the agent-relativity of moral reasons.

Moral and political theorists who espouse Egalitarianism and Marxism tend to assume that it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to put forward an original and plausible moral justification of classical liberalism. Professor Spector is concerned to build just such a justification. He reconstructs and then criticizes a familiar approach to the moral foundations of classical liberalism which rests on the maximization of negative freedom, and then frames an alternative theory centered in the obligation to protect positive freedom. In doing so he parts company not only with utilitarianism and contractarianism, but also with the theory of natural rights. Among the topics he discusses are the concepts of negative and positive freedom, the notion of a moral right, the connection between positive freedom and personal autonomy, the axiological uniqueness of each human being, and the agent-relativity of moral reasons.