Bargaining over the Bomb (Paperback)

William Spaniel

ISBN 10: 1108701841 / ISBN 13: 9781108701846

Published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019

About this Item

Paperback. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. It then explores impediments to a deal. The book will appeal to advanced undergraduate or graduate students studying nuclear security and formal models in international relations. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Seller Inventory # 9781108701846

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Bargaining over the Bomb (Paperback)
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
• Publication Date: 2019
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1108701841
• ISBN 13: 9781108701846
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: new

About this title

Synopsis

Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.

About the Author

William Spaniel is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He previously served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is also the author of Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook (2011).