Break in the Chain : Intelligence Ignored; Military Intelligence in Vietnam and Why the Easter Offensive Should Have Turned Out Differently

A riveting combination of war memoir and unique examination of the role of intelligence during the Easter Offensive 1972 written by an intelligence analyst who was there in 1972.

For the first two weeks of the Easter Offensive of 1972, the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment provided the only pertinent collateral intelligence available to American forces. Twice daily, the Detachment provided intelligence to the USS Buchanan (DDG-14), US Navy SEALS, and Special Forces units including tactical and strategic forecasts of enemy movements, information that was otherwise unavailable to U.S. units and advisors in-country.

In the weeks before the offensive, vital agent reports and verbal warnings by the 571st MI Detachment had been ignored by all the major commands; they were only heeded, and then only very reluctantly, once the Offensive began. This refusal to listen to the intelligence explains why no Army or USMC organizations were on-call to recover prisoners discovered or U.S. personnel downed behind enemy lines, as in the BAT-21 incident, as the last two Combat Recon Platoons in Vietnam had been disbanded six weeks before the offensive began. The lessons and experiences of Operation Lam Son 719 in the previous year were ignored, especially with regard to the NVA’s tactical use of tanks and artillery. In his memoir, Bob Baker, the only trained military intelligence analyst with the 571st MI Detachment in 1972, reveals these and other heroics and blunders during a key moment in the Vietnam War.

Table of Contents

Preface
Chapter 1 – Growing Up an Army Brat
Chapter 2 – Basic Training
Chapter 3 – USA Intelligence School
Chapter 4 – On To Vietnam
Chapter 5 – My New Home
Chapter 6 – The Laos Prelude
Chapter 7 – Skyline Ridge/Campaign Z
Chapter 8 – Disrupting Internal Affairs
Chapter 9 – ABC’s of the Easter Offensive of 1972
Chapter 10 -The Enemy Plan
Chapter 11 – What Enemy?
Chapter 12 – Day 1: Thursday, 30 March 1972 “...let slip the dogs of war.”
Chapter 13 - The South Vietnamese Marines and their U.S. Advisors
Chapter 14 - Cut and Run: What ARVN called “Mobility”
Chapter 15 - The 571st “Recce Squadron”
Chapter 16 - Too, Too Many Tanks
Chapter 17 - In Retrospect
Chapter 18 - Prologue to Surrender
Chapter 19 - A Massacre near the Rockpile?
Chapter 20 - NVA Artillery in the Easter Offensive
Chapter 21 - The Bridge at Dong Ha
Chapter 22 - NVA Tanks Resume
Chapter 23 - U.S.S. Buchanan (DDG-14)
Chapter 24 - BAT-21
Chapter 25 - Independent NVA Regiment Actions in I Corps Area
Chapter 26 – National Intelligence
Chapter 27 – Theater and Area Commands
Chapter 28 – Diversions and Deceptions at the Onset
Chapter 29 – 571st Military Intelligence Detachment
Chapter 30 - Observations, Reflections, and Conclusions
Chapter 31 – Astrology (tu vi) Use
Chapter 32 – Southern I Corps
Chapter 33 - Quang Trung 729
Chapter 34 – Lessons Still Disregarded
Epilogue
Appendices
Index

W.R. (Bob) Baker graduated first in the first Intelligence (Order of Battle) Analyst class to graduate from Fort Huachuca, Arizona in 1971. He was then the only intelligence analyst assigned to the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment/525th Military Intelligence Group in Da Nang, Vietnam, present at the time of the Easter Offensive of 1972. His further assignments after Vietnam included various positions for a combined total of 8 years with the European Defense Analysis Center/HQ, USEUCOM. He has received the Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service, Joint Service and Army Commendation Medals. Bob has authored several articles on the Easter Offensive of 1972, intelligence, and Vietnam.