Business Lobbies and the Power Structure in America: Evidence and Arguments.

Case studies of the legislative process and other sources of evidence indicate that American business lobbies have provided a nearly united front of opposition to even the most modest proposals meant to enhance societal well being in the United States—particularly on such issues as national health insurance, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and other initiatives like them. Jacobs argues that their unwillingness to compromise with labor and other social groups has made lobbies a barrier to policy-making and a source of social injustice. His evidence and arguments are presented concisely, persuasively and with conclusions that will be a subject of significant debate among academics, public policy makers, and decision makers throughout the private sector.

DAVID C. D. JACOBS is Associate Professor at the Kogod College of Business Administration, American University-Washington, D.C. He teaches courses on industrial relations and business and society, consults for trade unions, and serves on the national board of Americans for Democratic Action. He is the author of Collective Bargaining as an Instrument of Social Change (1994) and other writings in the journals of his fields.