Synopsis:
Revealing a secret World War II invasion plan that would have meant destruction worse than that caused by the atomic bombs, acclaimed military authors examine a plan code-named Downfall that would have turned Japan into a wasteland. 25,000 first printing.
Reviews:
Historians have challenged President Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, claiming that the war with Japan could have been ended by negotiations. Allen and Polmar (Rickover: Controversy and Genius) counter that the Japanese were not ready to surrender until after the second bomb was dropped. Accordingly, massive Allied landings on Japan's home islands thus remained a probability until very late in the war. The secret plan for this invasion, along with the Japanese plan for opposing it, are presented here for the first time. Experts predicted that the Americans would suffer at least half a million casualties, while critics have suggested that this figure was inflated to justify dropping the bomb. The authors have uncovered evidence to support the prediction: for example, the requisition of 370,000 Purple Heart medals by the Quartermaster Corps, indicating the number of wounded expected; 130,000 killed in action would fit the average war dead/wounded ratio, for a total of about 500,000 casualties. Finally, Allen and Polmar convincingly argue that Truman actively sought ways to end the conflict at the lowest cost of American and Japanese lives. This is a convincing case to settle a long-running controversy. History Book Club alternate.
Copyright 1995 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Complementing Stanley Weintraub's excellent The Last Great Victory , this well-shaped work outlines the course that the brass thought the fighting would take through late 1946, the time slated for Japan's defeat. Scenarios ranged from the enemy's sudden collapse to its suicidal resistance, a{ }la Okinawa. The Americans knew from codebreaking that the former was not likely and that the latter was certain if an invasion was ordered. Key to the planning, and the subsequent controversy over the atomic bomb, was the expected scale of American casualties. The authors review the estimates, the upper range of which compelled the search for an alternative to a ground battle. Here, Allen and Polmar deploy their complete research by describing the generals' thinking about B-29 bombings, about landing beaches and deception schemes, and about what tactical weapons to use: these might have included poison gas, so anxious were the Americans to minimize casualties. A Japanese plan for maximizing the bloodbath, using the kamikaze, gas, and germ warfare, portended a frightful crescendo that fortunately remains speculative, but this encompassing narrative--fit for all libraries--constitutes the war's "unwritten" final chapter Gilbert Taylor
In their latest book, Allen and Polmar (World War II, America at War 1941-1945, LJ 2/1/92) contribute to a growing number of works examining key events of World War II from a 50-year perspective. The authors examine individuals and issues involved in planning the massive invasion of Japan in the fall of 1945, as U.S. troops were mobilized to engage an enemy prepared to fight to the death to defend their homeland. Only the quick surrender of Japan following the dropping of the atomic bomb prevented what would have been the largest operation of the war. Established authors with many books of military history to their credit, Allen and Polmar provide an authoritative, detailed account of the final push to defeat of Japan. Among the may books on the subject published this season, theirs argues strongly for the necessity of dropping the bomb. An excellent work that would have been improved only by the valuable addition of maps; recommended for all libraries.?Robert Favini, Bentley Coll. Lib., Waltham, Mass.
Copyright 1995 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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