Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming Similar

Sergio Fabbrini

ISBN 10: 0199235619 / ISBN 13: 9780199235612

Published by Oxford University Press, 2008

About this Item

Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Sans jaquette. Edition 2008. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Good. Former library book. No dust jacket. Edition 2008. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming Similar
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Publication Date: 2008
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0199235619
• ISBN 13: 9780199235612
• Binding: No jacket
• Condition: Bon

About this title

Synopsis

This is a major new comparison of the American and European political systems. By deploying a powerful new model to analyze the two systems it draws some challenging conclusions about their increasing similarity. Professor Fabbrini argues that the process of regional integration in Europe over the last 60 years, has significantly reduced the historical differences between the democracies on either side of the Atlantic. The EU and the US are now similar because they represent two different species of the same political genus: the compound democracy.

The defining feature of compound democracy is the union of states and their citizens. Through such union, the states agree to pool their sovereignty within a larger integrated supra-state or supranational framework. They do so because these unions are primarily pacts for avoiding war. Because the states which made those unions were, and continue to be, asymmetrically correlated, any attempt to create a unified polity--that is a political system where the decision-making power is monopolized by only one institution--is likely to fail. He goes on to argue that the US and the EU are based on a multiple diffusion of powers which guarantees that any interest can have a voice in the decision-making process and no majority will be able to control all the institutional levels of the polity. This type of system allows an inter-states organization to operate as a supra-state polity--but it does so at the expense of decision-making capacity and accountability.

About the Author

Sergio Fabbrini is Professor of Political Science and Director of the School of International Studies at the University of Trento, and is Recurrent Visiting Professor of Comparative and American Politics at the Department of Political Science and Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California at Berkeley. He is the Editor of the Italian Journal of Political Science, and has published nine books, one co-authored book and nine edited or co-edited books, and one hundred scientific articles and essays in seven languages in Comparative and European Politics, American Politics, International Relations, Italian Politics and Political Theory.