Conditionals, Information, and Inference : International Workshop, WCII 2002, Hagen, Germany, May 13-15, 2002, Revised Selected Papers

Gabriele Kern-Isberner

ISBN 10: 3540253327 / ISBN 13: 9783540253327

Published by Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Conditionals are fascinating and versatile objects of knowledge representation. On the one hand, they may express rules in a very general sense, representing, for example, plausible relationships, physical laws, and social norms. On the other hand, as default rules or general implications, they constitute a basic tool for reasoning, even in the presence of uncertainty. In this sense, conditionals are intimately connected both to information and inference. Due to their non-Boolean nature, however, conditionals are not easily dealt with. They are not simply true or false - rather, a conditional 'if A then B' provides a context, A, for B to be plausible (or true) and must not be confused with 'A entails B' or with the material implication 'not A or B.' This ill- trates how conditionals represent information, understood in its strict sense as reduction of uncertainty. To learn that, in the context A, the proposition B is plausible, may reduce uncertainty about B and hence is information. The ab- ity to predict such conditioned propositions is knowledge and as such (earlier) acquired information. The rst work on conditional objects dates back to Boole in the 19th c- tury, and the interest in conditionals was revived in the second half of the 20th century, when the emerging Arti cial Intelligence made claims for appropriate formaltoolstohandle'generalizedrules.'Sincethen,conditionalshavebeenthe topic of countless publications, each emphasizing their relevance for knowledge representation, plausible reasoning, nonmonotonic inference, and belief revision.

Seller Inventory # 9783540253327

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Conditionals, Information, and Inference : International Workshop, WCII 2002, Hagen, Germany, May 13-15, 2002, Revised Selected Papers
• Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• Publication Date: 2005
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 3540253327
• ISBN 13: 9783540253327
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 235W x 155H x 13D millimeters 235 millimeters width by 155 millimeters height by 13 millimeters depth
• Weight: 365 grams

About this title

Synopsis

Conditionals are fascinating and versatile objects of knowledge representation. On the one hand, they may express rules in a very general sense, representing, for example, plausible relationships, physical laws, and social norms. On the other hand, as default rules or general implications, they constitute a basic tool for reasoning, even in the presence of uncertainty. In this sense, conditionals are intimately connected both to information and inference. Due to their non-Boolean nature, however, conditionals are not easily dealt with. They are not simply true or false ― rather, a conditional “if A then B” provides a context, A, for B to be plausible (or true) and must not be confused with “A entails B” or with the material implication “not A or B.” This ill- trates how conditionals represent information, understood in its strict sense as reduction of uncertainty. To learn that, in the context A, the proposition B is plausible, may reduce uncertainty about B and hence is information. The ab- ity to predict such conditioned propositions is knowledge and as such (earlier) acquired information. The ?rst work on conditional objects dates back to Boole in the 19th c- tury, and the interest in conditionals was revived in the second half of the 20th century, when the emerging Arti?cial Intelligence made claims for appropriate formaltoolstohandle“generalizedrules.”Sincethen,conditionalshavebeenthe topic of countless publications, each emphasizing their relevance for knowledge representation, plausible reasoning, nonmonotonic inference, and belief revision.