Contingent Future Persons : On the Ethics of Deciding Who Will Live, or Not, in the Future

J. C. Heller

ISBN 10: 0792347072 / ISBN 13: 9780792347071

Published by Springer Netherlands, Springer Netherlands, 1997

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.

Seller Inventory # 9780792347071

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Contingent Future Persons : On the Ethics of Deciding Who Will Live, or Not, in the Future
• Publisher: Springer Netherlands, Springer Netherlands
• Publication Date: 1997
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0792347072
• ISBN 13: 9780792347071
• Binding: Buch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 241W x 160H x 17D millimeters 241 millimeters width by 160 millimeters height by 17 millimeters depth
• Weight: 512 grams

About this title

Synopsis

How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend? In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.