Contract Theory

Bolton, Patrick; Dewatripont, Mathias

ISBN 10: 0262025760 / ISBN 13: 9780262025768

Published by The MIT Press (edition ), 2004

About this Item

It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

Seller Inventory # 0262025760-11-1

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Contract Theory
• Publisher: The MIT Press (edition )
• Publication Date: 2004
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0262025760
• ISBN 13: 9780262025768
• Binding: Hardcover
• Condition: Very Good

About this title

Synopsis

A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas.

Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.

About the Author

Patrick Bolton is John H. Scully Professor of Finance at Princeton University and managing editor of The Journal of the European Economic Association.

Mathias Dewatripont is Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, a Research Fellow at its European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), and Research Director of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).