Deception Integration in the U.S. Army

The Army has begun the process of relearning and integrating deception into doctrine andoperations. The state of doctrine and training both appear to be in need of aggressive review andmodification. History shows that it is a potent combat multiplier that can be decisive in gainingsurprise and initiative. History shows the costs of these operations to be less than one would expect.The risks appear relatively low as well. Benefits,· on the other hand, are uniformly high whencompared to cost and risk. The 1989 Army Deception White Paper attempted to set the azimuth fordeception integration. It failed to provide the required urgency and priority. This thesis uses thepremise of 'What the White Paper should have said" to explore the subject. The paper makesrecommendations based on interviews with senior defense officials, including Generals Starry,Cavazos, and Livsey; Dr. Edward Luttwak, and several experts in the field of deception. Therecommendations address doctrine development, parallel training, and the integration of deceptioninto planning. Training events such as BCTP, the NTC, JRTC, and the ARTEP must includedeception if deception is to become an effective component of Army doctrine and operations.