Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

Huber, John D.; Shipan, Charles R.

ISBN 10: 0521817447 / ISBN 13: 9780521817448

Published by Cambridge University Press, 2002

About this Item

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: 2002
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0521817447
• ISBN 13: 9780521817448
• Binding: hardcover
• Condition: New
• Weight: 22 ounces

About this title

Synopsis

The laws that legislatures adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. States, they argue that particular institutional forms--such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature--have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process.

Book Description

Who makes policy? Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why, and when, legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the U.S. states to provide support for our argument. Our argument and evidence provide numerous insights into the reasons for delegation and bureaucratic discretion, as well as insights into the normative consequences of incentives to limit discretion.