Diplomacy for Victory: Fdr and Unconditional Surrender

In January of 1943, at Casablanca, Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued a statement to the press which became a guiding policy of Allied Diplomacy in the Second World War.

That statement, demanding the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan, was attacked immediately by those who felt it would prolong the war. Now, three decades later, it is still the subject of heated debate. In this new study, Raymond G. O'Connor views the unconditional surrender policy as one of Roosevelt's great successes. It did not prolong the war, and by eliminating the preconditions for a negotiated peace, and the territorial disputes that accompany them, it helped to maintain the tenuous relationship between the three Allied leaders, so important in bringing about the Axis capitulation. Equally important, the policy was a vital instrument in achieving the war's political objectives―objectives the author says Roosevelt understood better than his British counterpart, Winston Churchill. With the availability of new sources, Professor O'Connor has been able to reconsider thoroughly all aspects of the unconditional surrender policy, from its origins and Churchill's role in its formation to its effects on the victory it helped to bring about.