Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory (Classics in Applied Mathematics, Series Number 23)

Olsder, Geert Jan,Basar, Tamer

ISBN 10: 089871429X / ISBN 13: 9780898714296

Published by Society for Industrial and Appli, 1999

About this Item

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory (Classics in Applied Mathematics, Series Number 23)
• Publisher: Society for Industrial and Appli
• Publication Date: 1999
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 089871429X
• ISBN 13: 9780898714296
• Binding: Paperback
• Edition: 2nd Edition
• Condition: Good

About this title

Synopsis

Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.

Book Description

This text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. Fully revised in 1995, this edition features new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium.