THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF GROUP DISAGREEMENT

This book brings together philosophers to investigate the nature and normativity of group disagreement. Debates in the epistemology of disagreement have mainly been concerned with idealized cases of peer disagreement between individuals. However, most real-life disagreements are complex and often take place within and between groups. Ascribing views, beliefs, and judgments to groups is a common phenomenon that is well researched in the literature on the ontology and epistemology of groups. The chapters in this volume seek to connect these literatures and to explore both intra- and inter- group disagreements. They apply their discussions to a range of political, religious, social, and scientific issues. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement is an important resource for students and scholars working on social and applied epistemology; disagreement; and topics at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and politics.

Fernando Broncano-Berrocal is a Talent Attraction Fellow at the Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain. He works mainly in epistemology, with an emphasis on virtue epistemology, philosophy of luck, social epistemology, and collective epistemology. He is the co-editor, with J. Adam Carter, of The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, 2021). His work has appeared in such places as Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Synthese, and Erkenntnis.

J. Adam Carter is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, UK. His expertise is mainly in epistemology with particular focus on virtue epistemology, social epistemology relativism, know-how, epistemic luck, and epistemic defeat. He is the author of Metaepistemology and Relativism (2016), co-author of A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How (2018), and co-editor, with Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, of The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, 2021). His work has appeared in Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.