Economic Analysis of Liability Rules

Satish Kumar Jain

ISBN 10: 8132235029 / ISBN 13: 9788132235026

Published by Springer, Springer, 2016

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.

Seller Inventory # 9788132235026

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
• Publisher: Springer, Springer
• Publication Date: 2016
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 8132235029
• ISBN 13: 9788132235026
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 235W x 155H x 11D millimeters 235 millimeters width by 155 millimeters height by 11 millimeters depth
• Weight: 300 grams

About this title

Synopsis

This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.

The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.

About the Author

Satish K. Jain is Professor at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India. He did his Master’s in Economics from Delhi School of Economics, and Ph.D.  from the University of Rochester, USA. His areas of interest are law and economics, and social choice theory.