The Effect of Prices and Political Unity on Inter-state Gas Bargaining | Adviser: Professor Thomas F. Remington

Carson Dimick

ISBN 10: 3843394075 / ISBN 13: 9783843394079

Published by LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2011

About this Item

The Effect of Prices and Political Unity on Inter-state Gas Bargaining | Adviser: Professor Thomas F. Remington | Carson Dimick | Taschenbuch | 72 S. | Englisch | 2011 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783843394079 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.

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Bibliographic Details

• Title: The Effect of Prices and Political Unity on Inter-state Gas Bargaining | Adviser: Professor Thomas F. Remington
• Publisher: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
• Publication Date: 2011
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 3843394075
• ISBN 13: 9783843394079
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 220W x 150H x 5D millimeters 220 millimeters width by 150 millimeters height by 5 millimeters depth
• Weight: 125 grams
• Seller catalogs:
  • Bücher

About this title

Synopsis

While a great deal of research has gone into the determinants of inter-state bargaining efficacy, current explanations often fail to predict the success of a bargaining episode. To fill the theoretical gap, two elements need to be considered. Often, asymmetrical interdependence is thought of as a source of bargaining power. But, the nature of the good that creates the asymmetrical interdependence has not been examined. I test whether the price of the good affects bargaining power and the relevance of the separation of purpose literature in the context of inter-state bargaining. Does the level of domestic political unity in the target state affect bargaining outcomes? The findings suggest that the price of the good leveraged in an instance of inter-state bargaining and the level of domestic political unity affect the bargaining result. As the price of the leveraged good rises, bargaining power increases. And, higher levels of domestic unity in the target state increase the sender state's bargaining efficacy. I also use the findings to develop a framework to explain the efficacy of Russia's post-2000 inter-state gas bargaining with energy dependent CIS members.

About the Author

Emory University, Atlanta, GA Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Political Science, May 2010 Magna Cum Laude