Emotion and Object

J. R. S. Wilson

ISBN 10: 0521114772 / ISBN 13: 9780521114776

Published by Cambridge University Press, 2009

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural difference - causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences.

Seller Inventory # 9780521114776

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Emotion and Object
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: 2009
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0521114772
• ISBN 13: 9780521114776
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 216W x 140H x 12D millimeters 216 millimeters width by 140 millimeters height by 12 millimeters depth
• Weight: 295 grams

About this title

Synopsis

A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural difference – causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences.

Book Description

A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour.