Synopsis
"The Ripcord Association is proud to endorse this important work on the battle of Firebase Ripcord. By honoring the service and sacrifice of those who fought there, this book preserves a vital chapter of our shared history and gives voice to the men who lived it. We are grateful that the story of Firebase Ripcord and its veterans will be carried forward to future generations." ― Frank Marshall, A/2/506, vice president of the Ripcord Association
The campaign around Firebase Ripcord in 1970 was the last major American offensive effort in the Vietnam War. It went badly and is now little known. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division tried to go back to the area where the Hamburger Hill battles had been fought the year before, but they never made it due to a combination of enemy resistance, lack of resources owing to a reduction in force under Vietnamization, and serious command problems.
Ripcord was supposed to provide a stepping stone for an incursion into the A Shau Valley, a major North Vietnamese staging and warehouse area in the northern part of South Vietnam. It took three attempts to establish the base—the result of bad planning, bad weather, and enemy resistance. Once the base was established, the North Vietnamese gradually built up their forces in the area, effectively attacked surrounding units and bases, and eventually isolated it. Instead of simply disappearing as they had done in the past, they stepped up resistance and forced the Americans to abandon the campaign.
In 1970, the Americans were unable to conduct the sort of campaign that they had previously launched. Instead of piling on to overwhelm the enemy, they chose to withdraw to avoid further casualties in an unpopular war. As the Americans were weakening, the North Vietnamese were getting stronger and had learned much about how to deal with American superiority in firepower and mobility. Beyond that, the American system of rotating officers in and out of command assignments took place without any regard for the situation on the ground, with key commanders changing in the middle of the campaign and new arrivals having to orient themselves on the fly. At the higher levels of command, there was also competition for commands of combat units, as these were necessary for career officers to obtain their promotions. Several of the key leaders in the campaign had little relevant experience, which proved costly to the men in the field. At lower levels, most of the officers and men in the campaign performed well, despite the increasing sense that they were risking their lives for no purpose.
Based on over 100 interviews with veterans, this is the first complete critical account and analysis of the last American offensive effort in Vietnam—the failed Firebase Ripcord campaign in 1970.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Prologue
Maps
1 Introduction
2 Early 1970
3 The First Try
4 April Fool’s Day
5 Third Time’s a Charm
6 Cat and Mouse
7 A Bad Neighborhood
8 The Changing of the Guard
9 July 1
10 Hill 902—Hell Before Dawn
11 An Escalating Situation
12 Working the Hills
13 Hill 1000
14 Another Try
15 Hill 805
16 Bait
17 One More Try
18 Hell on a Hilltop
19 Inferno
20 Desperate Measures
21 Ordeal
22 Getting Out of Dodge
23 Postmortem
Note on Sources
Note on Oral Histories
Endnotes
Index
About the Author
James R. Smither is a Professor of History at Grand Valley State University and is the Director of Grand Valley State University Veterans History Project. He has conducted over 1,000 oral history interviews with military veterans, including over 100 with veterans of the Ripcord campaign. He is co-editor of A Surgeon’s Civil War: The Civil War Letters of Daniel M. Holt, M.D. and editor of Death and Life in the Big Red One.
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