Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory)

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers a new conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This new conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful new way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

"This is a superbly written and insightful book on the philosophical foundations of game theory. The book is superbly written and argued and should be read by anyone interested in the foundations of the theory of rational choice." Peter Vallentyne, Ethics

"...game and decision theory are more and more an interdisciplinary subject, in which mathematicians, economists but also political scientists, philosophers and logicians make fundamental contributions, among which is this interesting and important book." Mathematical Reviews