Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision

Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer

ISBN 10: 3658241322 / ISBN 13: 9783658241322

Published by Springer Vieweg, 2019

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.

Seller Inventory # 9783658241322

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision
• Publisher: Springer Vieweg
• Publication Date: 2019
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 3658241322
• ISBN 13: 9783658241322
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 240W x 168H x 13D millimeters 240 millimeters width by 168 millimeters height by 13 millimeters depth
• Weight: 384 grams

About this title

Synopsis

Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.

About the Author

Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer published her work with Kölner Wissenschaftsverlag until 2018.