European Institutions as an Interest Group (Paperback)

Roland Vaubel

ISBN 10: 0255366345 / ISBN 13: 9780255366342

Published by Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 2009

About this Item

Paperback. The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national and local governments, as well as individuals and private businesses. There would appear to be no reverse gear in this process, while objections from the general public, as expressed in periodic referenda, tend to be brushed aside. This ground-breaking study explains increasing centralization by analyzing the economic incentives at work. The structure of European institutions means they have a vested interest in ever-closer union because this enhances their influence and prestige. Moreover, the bureaucrats themselves are self-selecting. Those that are pro-EU are more likely to seek positions in these organizations and therefore tend to favor policies which give the institutions more responsibilities. The author sets out a series of reforms designed to counteract the centralizing tendency and to ensure that the role of EU bodies is more closely aligned with the preferences of citizens. The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national and local governments, as well as individuals and private businesses. This book explains increasing centralization by analyzing the economic incentives at work. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Seller Inventory # 9780255366342

Bibliographic Details

• Title: European Institutions as an Interest Group (Paperback)
• Publisher: Institute of Economic Affairs, London
• Publication Date: 2009
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0255366345
• ISBN 13: 9780255366342
• Binding: Paperback
• Condition: new

About this title

Synopsis

The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national and local governments, as well as individuals and private businesses. There would appear to be no reverse gear in this process, while objections from the general public, as expressed in periodic referenda, tend to be brushed aside. This ground-breaking study explains increasing centralization by analyzing the economic incentives at work. The structure of European institutions means they have a vested interest in ever-closer union because this enhances their influence and prestige. Moreover, the bureaucrats themselves are self-selecting. Those that are pro-EU are more likely to seek positions in these organizations and therefore tend to favor policies which give the institutions more responsibilities. The author sets out a series of reforms designed to counteract the centralizing tendency and to ensure that the role of EU bodies is more closely aligned with the preferences of citizens.