Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem

Shear, Jonathan

ISBN 10: 026269221X / ISBN 13: 9780262692212

Published by MIT Press, 1999

About this Item

Why doesn't all this cognitive processing go on "in the dark," without any consciousness at all? In this book philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline of consciousness studies. Editor(s): Shear, Jonathan. Series: Bradford Books. Num Pages: 430 pages, illustrations. BIC Classification: HPM; JMR. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 253 x 178 x 25. Weight in Grams: 928. . 1999. Reprint. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Seller Inventory # V9780262692212

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem
• Publisher: MIT Press
• Publication Date: 1999
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 026269221X
• ISBN 13: 9780262692212
• Binding: Soft cover
• Condition: New

About this title

Synopsis

Why doesn't all this cognitive processing go on "in the dark," without any consciousness at all? In this book philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline of consciousness studies.

At the 1994 landmark conference "Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness", philosopher David Chalmers distinguished between the "easy" problems and the "hard" problem of consciousness research. According to Chalmers, the easy problems are to explain cognitive functions such as discrimination, integration, and the control of behavior; the hard problem is to explain why these functions should be associated with phenomenal experience. Why doesnt all this cognitive processing go on "in the dark", without any consciousness at all? In this book, philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline of consciousness studies. Some take issue with Chalmers' distinction, arguing that the hard problem is a non-problem, or that the explanatory gap is too wide to be bridged. Others offer alternative suggestions as to how the problem might be solved, whether through cognitive science, fundamental physics, empirical phenomenology, or with theories that take consciousness as irreducible.

Contributors
Bernard J. Baars, Douglas J. Bilodeau, David Chalmers, Patricia S. Churchland, Thomas Clark, C. J. S. Clarke, Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Stuart Hameroff, Valerie Hardcastle, David Hodgson, Piet Hut, Christof Koch, Benjamin Libet, E. J. Lowe, Bruce MacLennan, Colin McGinn, Eugene Mills, Kieron OHara, Roger Penrose, Mark C. Price, William S. Robinson, Gregg Rosenberg, Tom Scott, William Seager, Jonathan Shear, Roger N. Shepard, Henry Stapp, Francisco J. Varela, Max Velmans, Richard Warner

About the Author

Robert S. Chirinko is Professor of Finance at the University of Illinois at Chicago.