Functional Models of Cognition: Self-Organizing Dynamics and Semantic Structures in Cognitive Systems (Theory and Decision Library A: (27), Band 27)

Carsetti, A.:

ISBN 10: 0792360729 / ISBN 13: 9780792360728

Published by Springer 30.11.1999., 1999

About this Item

314 Seiten Hardcover ohne SU !! Sehr gutes Exemplar. F123 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 608 15,6 x 1,9 x 23,4 cm, , Hardcover/Pappeinband.

Seller Inventory # 157624

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Functional Models of Cognition: Self-Organizing Dynamics and Semantic Structures in Cognitive Systems (Theory and Decision Library A: (27), Band 27)
• Publisher: Springer 30.11.1999.
• Publication Date: 1999
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0792360729
• ISBN 13: 9780792360728
• Binding: Hardcover
• Edition: Auflage: 2000.
• Condition: Sehr gut
• Weight: 608 grams
• Seller catalogs:
  • Medizin

About this title

Synopsis

Our ontology as well as our grammar are, as Quine affirms, ineliminable parts of our conceptual contribution to our theory of the world. It seems impossible to think of enti­ ties, individuals and events without specifying and constructing, in advance, a specific language that must be used in order to speak about these same entities. We really know only insofar as we regiment our system of the world in a consistent and adequate way. At the level of proper nouns and existence functions we have, for instance, a standard form of a regimented language whose complementary apparatus consists of predicates, variables, quantifiers and truth functions. If, for instance, the discoveries in the field of Quantum Mechanics should oblige us, in the future, to abandon the traditional logic of truth functions, the very notion of existence, as established until now, will be chal­ lenged. These considerations, as developed by Quine, introduce us to a conceptual perspective like the "internal realist" perspective advocated by Putnam whose principal aim is, for cer­ tain aspects, to link the philosophical approaches developed respectively by Quine and Wittgenstein. Actually, Putnam conservatively extends the approach to the problem of ref­ erence outlined by Quine: in his opinion, to talk of "facts" without specifying the language to be used is to talk of nothing.