Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Alvin E. Roth

ISBN 10: 0521022746 / ISBN 13: 9780521022743

Published by Cambridge University Press, 2005

About this Item

Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Seller Inventory # 9780521022743

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: 2005
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 0521022746
• ISBN 13: 9780521022743
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 229W x 152H x 24D millimeters 229 millimeters width by 152 millimeters height by 24 millimeters depth
• Weight: 653 grams

About this title

Synopsis

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Book Description

Provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory, including the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models.