Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats

Vicki M. Bier

ISBN 10: 1441946888 / ISBN 13: 9781441946881

Published by Springer, Springer Dez 2011, 2011

About this Item

This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book's primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including threats of terrorism and war). These tools will help to address problems of global security and facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 248 pp. Englisch.

Seller Inventory # 9781441946881

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats
• Publisher: Springer, Springer Dez 2011
• Publication Date: 2011
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 1441946888
• ISBN 13: 9781441946881
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 229W x 152H x 14D millimeters 229 millimeters width by 152 millimeters height by 14 millimeters depth
• Weight: 365 grams

About this title

Synopsis

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book’s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including threats of terrorism and war). These tools will help to address problems of global security and facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.

From the Back Cover

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models will be developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book’s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into unified techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity.

 

In this book, leading researchers combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used by security personnel to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of terrorism and war). This means a comprehensive treatment of such problems must consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be protected and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat (that is, beyond the static nature of the threat). The book provides a set of scientific tools for analyzing and applying game-theoretic reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These scientific tools address problems of global safety and create more cost-effective defensive investments.