Heavy Matter: Urban Operations' Density of Challlenges

This study proposes a new way of viewing urban operations, among the most complex challenges facing America's armed forces. Viewing urban operations in light of relevant densities, regardless of whether combat, stability, or support missions predominate, offers a viable means of approaching an otherwise most imposing puzzle. Doing so provides a vehicle to better understand how to conceptualize issues of pertinence,the tasks and missions that will address those issues, and the specific ways of employing elements of national power in the service of strategic objectives. Following an overview of density's potential influence on military operations, the author proposes and discusses five approaches to dealing with its challenges: Matching density with density, effectively reducing densities, maintaining selected densities, addressing density asymmetrically, and capitalizing on urban densities. He concludes with an analysis of density and its implications for information operations conducted in built-up areas.

Urban operations are among the most complex challenges facingtoday's U.S. armed forces. Whereas there is no lack of confidenceamong tacticians when debating doctrine for fighting on open terrain,discussions of how to deal with missions in today's villages,towns, and cities inspire far less confidence, whether or not thosemissions entail combat operations. Modern cities dwarf any forcethat might be committed to their interiors. Even far smaller collectionsof man-made structures pose unfamiliar problems. There havebeen many recent examples of American forces operating in built-upareas, but none have involved anything resembling a major peercompetitor. Most have consisted of limited-duration small unitactions. As a result, few active duty officers and noncommissionedofficers have urban combat experience. Those watching othernations' forces confront such operations gain no comfort; severalhave stated what others also know: American forces too would beseverely tested by a Grozny-like contingency. This publication proposesa new way of viewing the problem of urban operations, onethat will perhaps aid in better understanding its multifaceted andcomplicated nature and help those responsible for preparing andconducting future undertakings.Research in conjunction with this document was sponsored by theJoint Staff (J8 Urban Working Group) and conducted in the InternationalSecurity and Defense Policy Center of RAND's NationalDefense Research Institute (NDRI) and in the Force Developmentand Technology Program of RAND Arroyo Center. Both NDRI andthe Arroyo Center are federally funded research and developmentcenters, the first sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,Urban operations are among the most complex challenges facingtoday's U.S. armed forces. Whereas there is no lack of confidenceamong tacticians when debating doctrine for fighting on open terrain,discussions of how to deal with missions in today's villages,towns, and cities inspire far less confidence, whether or not thosemissions entail combat operations. Modern cities dwarf any forcethat might be committed to their interiors. Even far smaller collectionsof man-made structures pose unfamiliar problems. There havebeen many recent examples of American forces operating in built-upareas, but none have involved anything resembling a major peercompetitor. Most have consisted of limited-duration small unitactions. As a result, few active duty officers and noncommissionedofficers have urban combat experience. Those watching othernations' forces confront such operations gain no comfort; severalhave stated what others also know: American forces too would beseverely tested by a Grozny-like contingency. This publication proposesa new way of viewing the problem of urban operations, onethat will perhaps aid in better understanding its multifaceted andcomplicated nature and help those responsible for preparing andconducting future undertakings.Research in conjunction with this document was sponsored by theJoint Staff (J8 Urban Working Group) and conducted in the InternationalSecurity and Defense Policy Center of RAND's NationalDefense Research Institute (NDRI) and in the Force Developmentand Technology Program of RAND Arroyo Center. Both NDRI andthe Arroyo Center are federally funded research and developmentcenters, the first sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,Urban operations are among the most complex challenges facingtoday's U.S. armed forces. Whereas there is no lack of confidenceamong tacticians when debating doctrine for fighting on open terrain,discussions of how to deal with missions in today's villages,towns, and cities inspire far less confidence, whether or not thosemissions entail combat operations. Modern cities dwarf any forcethat might be committed to their interiors. Even far smaller collectionsof man-made structures pose unfamiliar problems. There havebeen many recent examples of American forces operating in built-upareas, but none have involved anything resembling a major peercompetitor. Most have consisted of limited-duration small unitactions. As a result, few active duty officers and noncommissionedofficers have urban combat experience. Those watching othernations' forces confront such operations gain no comfort; severalhave stated what others also know: American forces too would beseverely tested by a Grozny-like contingency. This publication proposesa new way of viewing the problem of urban operations, onethat will perhaps aid in better understanding its multifaceted andcomplicated nature and help those responsible for preparing andconducting future undertakings.