Synopsis
Human error is implicated in nearly all aviation accidents, yet most investigation and prevention programs are not designed around any theoretical framework of human error. Appropriate for all levels of expertise, the book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, regardless of operational setting (i.e. military, commercial, or general aviation). The book contains a complete description of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which incorporates James Reason's model of latent and active failures as a foundation. Widely disseminated among military and civilian organizations, HFACS encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and elements of supervisory and organizational failure. It attracts a very broad readership. Specifically, the book serves as the main textbook for a course in aviation accident investigation taught by one of the authors at the University of Illinois. This book will also be used in courses designed for military safety officers and flight surgeons in the U.S. Navy, Army and the Canadian Defense Force, who currently utilize the HFACS system during aviation accident investigations. Additionally, the book has been incorporated into the popular workshop on accident analysis and prevention provided by the authors at several professional conferences world-wide. The book is also targeted for students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University which has satellite campuses throughout the world and offers a course in human factors accident investigation for many of its majors. In addition, the book will be incorporated into courses offered by Transportation Safety International and the Southern California Safety Institute. Finally, this book serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.
About the Author
Dr. Shappell is an internationally renowned expert and a highly sought after consultant and speaker in the fields of human factors, systems safety, error management, and accident investigation. He formerly served as Human Factors Branch Chief at the U.S. Naval Safety Center and as a human factors accident investigation consultant for the Joint Service Safety Chiefs. Prior to the Naval Safety Center, he served as the Force Aerospace Psychologist for the Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. His work experiences also include serving as the Human Factors Research Branch Manager at the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute of the Federal Aviation Administration in Oklahoma City, OK. He has published over 50 papers in the fields of human error analysis and accident investigation, workplace injuries, and fatigue. Dr. Douglas A. Wiegmann is a tenured professor in the Department of Human Factors at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign. He is an internationally recognized expert in the fields of human error analysis and accident investigation, and has formerly served as an aviation psychologist for the U.S. Navy and an accident investigator for the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Dr. Wiegmann was the official human factors consultant to the U.S. Department of Energy during the investigation of the August 2003 blackout and consultant to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board during their analysis of the causes underlying the crash of the NASA space shuttle. He is a board certified human factors professional and the past-president of the Aerospace Human Factors Association.
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