The book argues that CEO power in U.S. industrial firms is not fixed, but shaped by shifting political dynamics on the board.
It offers a clear framework for understanding how executives gain, lose, and contest control over their organizations, across a 30-year span of study.
The work contrasts two competing ideas: one that CEOs entrench their power, and another that power decays and is constantly renegotiated. Through an event-history analysis, it shows how tenure, board composition, and performance interact to influence CEO succession. The result is a grounded look at how internal politics can shield leaders from market pressures, and how governance structures shape the fate of top executives.
- Learn the two models of power in organizations: institutionalization versus circulation, and how they predict CEO behavior.
- See how board dynamics, such as the mix of inside and outside directors, affect a CEO’s ability to steer the firm.
- Explore why poor performance does not always trigger turnover, and how obsolescence and contestation drive change over time.
- Discover implications for understanding corporate governance, succession, and leadership strategy in large public firms.
Ideal for readers of corporate governance, organizational politics, and executive leadership, this edition sheds light on why a CEO’s grip can loosen even as a company faces tough times.