Incursion: From America's Chokehold on the Nva Lifelines to the Sacking of the Cambodian Sanctuaries

A recreation of events leading up to Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia in 1970 discusses military strategy and campaigns, diplomatic maneuvering, and other key factors

By the author of Pleiku , this is an informative look at the interdiction campaign in central Vietnam from late 1968 to 1970 that culminated in the most controversial operation of the war, the incursion into Cambodia in May-June 1970. Using the 1st Cavalry Division as his narrative centerpiece, Coleman reveals for the first time how brilliantly successful that division was in interdicting supply and reinforcement routes from Cambodia to Viet Cong bases around Saigon, how this forced the enemy to expand bases in Cambodia and how President Nixon finally made the momentous decision to send U.S./South Vietnamese forces into that neutral country to destory the Communist "sanctuaries." Coleman, an information officer with the 1st Cav during the period in question, provides a vivid and well-balanced account of the diplomatic as well as the military aspects of the incursion, and shows how public opinion in the United States affected the political direction of this phase of the war in Southeast Asia. Photos.
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Perhaps the most controversial military operation of the Vietnam War was the US Army's May 1, 1970, assault on previously sacrosanct Communist bases and supply dumps in Cambodia. All but ignored in most accounts, however, are the events leading up to the cross-border foray. Coleman (Pleiku, 1988) bridges this gap effectively and instructively with a wide-ranging overview of the battleground and of the diplomatic and home-front maneuvering that took place during the 28 months between the Tet Offensive of 1968 and the incursion. A decorated combat veteran of the clashes he chronicles, the author recounts how the interdiction strategies employed by Gen. Creighton Abrams in connection with the pacification programs initiated by William Colby (then a CIA station chief) forced the North Vietnam Army to move its materiel stockpiles from sites around Saigon into putatively neutral Cambodia. With peace negotiations stalled in Paris and a phased reduction in American troops already underway, the Nixon Administration approved bombing these hitherto inviolate havens, eventually okaying an air/ground attack as well. In Coleman's view, though, the President squandered US advantage by publicly limiting the raid to 60 days and its thrust to 30 kilometers beyond the frontier. He also argues that the war's outcome could have proved very different had allied commanders instituted an interdiction/pacification campaign by 1967. Even so, the author reckons, the curtailed invasion (which denied NVA troops a wealth of ammunition, medical supplies, weapons, and training facilities) bought the Thieu regime two extra years. Authoritative and accessible. The frequently gripping text includes eight pages of photos and a like number of maps (not seen). -- Copyright ©1991, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

The 1st Cavalry Division was arguably the most famous American unit of the Vietnam War. Its revolutionary helicopter air assault doctrine was first covered by the author in Pleiku ( LJ 9/1/88). He now analyzes the Air Cav versus the North Vietnamese in the area stretching west of Saigon to the Cambodian border from late 1968 to the offensive into Cambodia in April 1970. The 1st Cavalry was charged with disrupting enemy supply lines, and the North Vietnamese reacted by attacking isolated U.S. firebases. The fighting for these outposts is vividly described by the veteran author. The book would have been better without constant asides on the political homefront--Coleman criticizes every Washington military decision--but as a good unit history this is recommended for Vietnam collections. (Maps not seen.)-- John R. Vallely, Siena Coll. Lib., Loudonville, N.Y.
Copyright 1991 Reed Business Information, Inc.