How Insurgencies End

RAND studied 89 modern insurgency cases to test conventional understanding about how insurgencies end. Findings relevant to policymakers and analysts include that modern insurgencies last about ten years; withdrawal of state support cripples insurgencies; civil defense forces are useful for both sides; pseudodemocracies fare poorly against insurgents; and governments win more often in the long run.

Martin C. Libicki, a Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation since 1998, works on the relationship between information technology and national security. He has written numerous monographs on the subject, notably What is Information Warfare, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, and Who Runs What in the Global Information Grid. Dr Libicki is also the editor of the RAND Textbook, New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking. His most recent assignments at RAND have been to develop a post-9/11 information technology strategy for the U.S. Department of Justice and DARPA's Terrorist Information Awareness program, conduct an information security analysis for the FBI, investigate targeting strategies of al Queda, and assess CIA's R&D venture, In-Q-Tel. He previously taught at the National Defense University. Dr Libicki received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley in 1978.