Insuring Premium Risk in Competitive Health Insurance Markets. Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Band 15.

Kifmann, Mathias:

ISBN 10: 3161477405 / ISBN 13: 9783161477409

Published by Mohr Siebeck Verlag;, 2002

About this Item

155 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber und kann entsprechende Merkmale aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 370.

Seller Inventory # 2282612

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Insuring Premium Risk in Competitive Health Insurance Markets. Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Band 15.
• Publisher: Mohr Siebeck Verlag
• Publication Date: 2002
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 3161477405
• ISBN 13: 9783161477409
• Binding: gebundene Ausgabe
• Condition: Gut
• Weight: 370 grams
• Seller catalogs:
  • 6043 Finanzen

About this title

Synopsis

English summary: Auf privatwirtschaftlich organisierten Krankenversicherungsmarkten wird die Pramie entsprechend des individuellen Risikos erhoben. Verschlechtert sich der Gesundheitszustand einer Person, so besteht die Gefahr, dass die Pramie angehoben wird. Die Person sieht sich einer unsicheren Pramie gegenuber. Mathias Kifmann untersucht, wie dieses Pramienrisiko auf wettbewerblich organisierten Krankenversicherungsmarkten versichert werden kann. Drei grundsatzliche Moglichkeiten der Absicherung werden analysiert und verglichen. In einer vertiefenden theoretischen Analyse untersucht der Autor Reformmoglichkeiten der privaten und der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung. German description: How can it be avoided that consumers face premium risk, i.e. increases in their premiums when their health status deteriorates? Mathias Kifmann examines how this problem which is a major challenge for private health insurance markets can be solved. Three principal ways to insure premium risk which preserve competition among health insurers are analyzed and compared. Guaranteed renewable contracts ensure premiums independent of changes in the health status by requiring a life-time commitment to an insurer. Premium insurance compensates an increase in premiums if the health status changes. Under community rating, the government rules out risk-based premiums by requiring that insurers set a uniform premium for all insured.Mathias Kifmann pays particular attention to the challenges posed by managed care. He argues that managed care can aggravate the lock-in problem under guaranteed renewable contracts. He demonstrates that an alternative contract is superior to guaranteed renewable contracts. This contract creates incentives for insurers to behave in the interest of consumers by specifying payments upon switching to another insurer. If insurers are community-rated, an important question is whether they should be allowed to offer managed care besides traditional health insurance. The author shows that managed care can be used as a pure risk-selection device under community rating. However, the introduction of managed care can also be to the benefit of everyone. To obtain such welfare gains, it may be necessary to tax some insurance plans and to subsidize others.

About the Author

Mathias Kifmann, Born 1970; 1991-96 studies of economics at Ludwig-Maximilian's University in Munich and at the London School of Economics; since 1996 assistant at the University of Constance; 2001 PhD at the University of Constance.