Intelligence Failures and Decent Intervals

Intelligence Failures and Decent Intervals provides a look at the truth behind military and diplomatic blunders to which "intelligence failure labels" have been attached that are intended to hide leadership failures responsible for the blunders. From the 1950 Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War, to the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the so-called surprise attack that began the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, the book exposes instance after instance in which this egregious practice has occurred. The detriment thus reaped by the practice inures to the erosion of the Intelligence Community's effectiveness and ultimately that of our national security. The book also offers support in the official position of the U.S. Army's Center of Military History for the author's suspicion that the Vietnam War was "lost" as a result of widespread leadership failures related to the discipline of Signals Intelligence.

P.G. Kivett, Esquire is a retired foreign intelligence analyst with more than eighteen years service in SIGINT - Signals Intelligence - in Asia and at the National Security Agency, and non-SIGINT intelligence in Europe with NATO. A recently retired attorney as well, he is a past writer and editor of legal materials published in Europe and America and political commentary published in Asia. Mr. Kivett resides in Fresno, California with his wife Grace.