Iraqi Force Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences for Failure

The creation of effective Iraqi security forces is vital to the success of U.S. and Coalition efforts in Iraq. Without a minimum level of security, Iraq will never achieve effective governance, the rule of law, economic reconstruction, or political reconciliation. Even with a surge of U.S. troops, neither Baghdad nor the rest of Iraq can be secured without significant support from Iraqi security forces, including the military and police.

The effort to create Iraqi military, security, and police forces has been more successful than Iraqi political and economic efforts, but it has not achieved the level of success the United States initially anticipated. The impressive numerical growth of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) masks serious problems in the way the United States and its allies have approached force development. The demands of rapidly creating a large force in the midst of an insurgency and sectarian conflict have been complicated by the lack of preexisting U.S. plans for ISF development, limited resources, and the grindingly slow U.S. responses to the changing security situation. The task has been further complicated by corrupt and/or incompetent Iraqi governance and by sectarian and ethnic politics and feuding. All of these problems have affected the loyalty, discipline, training, desertion rates, and combat effectiveness of the Iraqi Army and police forces.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.