The Later Wittgenstein on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality.

This book is based on my PhD dissertation, which examined Wittgenstein’s later ideas on language and its role in the constitution of reality, and the influence of the earlier philosophical tradition on the development of his ideas on these issues and represents an edited version of the third part of my dissertation.
I argued that the problem of the constitution of reality in Wittgenstein’s later work is both significant and underexplored, especially in comparison with the analogous problem in the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This disparity arises because Wittgenstein does not explicitly address the topic in his later period, in contrast to his earlier work, where he clearly discusses the concept of Weltbild and its formation. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein described the logical Weltbild and the process of its construction. I examined the distinction between Wittgenstein’s early logical construction and his later anthropological account of the constitution of reality. I reconstructed this process, identifying three key levels: grammatical, intersubjective (conventional) and ethical (mystical). This reconstruction faced two major challenges: (1) the fragmentation of Wittgenstein’s text, his aphoristic style, and the apparent contradictions between his ideas and descriptions, and (2) the analysis of ‘operative concepts’ such as language-games, grammar, forms of life, way of life, picture of the world, and family resemblance, which are not clearly defined and vary considerably between texts and periods.
Furthermore, I believe that reading Wittgenstein solely as an analytic philosopher s a narrow perspective that addresses only one aspect of his broader philosophical interests. This interpretation, particularly in relation to his understanding of language and its connection to reality in his later work (from 1929), offers a limited and often distorted view of his ideas. I will also present arguments in support of my hypothesis that Wittgenstein's understanding of constitution and the role of language in this process bears significant similarities to the ideas of several of his contemporaries.
Wittgenstein argued that it is impossible to adequately express in verbal language the subjective experience of pain or the full depth of aesthetic experience. He claimed that ethics, religion – especially religious feeling – and aesthetics resist clear expression in everyday language. Wittgenstein also discussed the distinction between external and internal languages, emphasising that there are other forms of language in addition to verbal language: pictorial language, gesture language and sound language. He emphasised the pluralism of language games, forms of life, and pictures of the world, all of which are historically and culturally conditioned. Many of Wittgenstein’s ideas – such as his anti-scientism, his acute sense of crisis and decline, his interest in pictorial language, his view of philosophy as an activity, critique of dogmas, his recognition of the symbolic nature of language, his notion that meaning dependents on use, and his understanding of language as an integral part of human life – have significant similarities with the ideas of his continental contemporaries, including the later Husserl, Heidegger, Cassirer, Gadamer, and others.
In my research I support a broader approach to Wittgenstein’s legacy, emphasising the need to explore his ideas on psychology, culture, music, ethics and religion. Since Wittgenstein’s writing style was not academic and he did not leave behind a coherent, systematic text, it is essential to examine his thoughts on various philosophical topics in all his written materials. This includes his notes, diaries, correspondence with friends and family and the lecture notes taken by his students.