Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information

Language: English

Published by Springer Berlin Heidelberg Jul 1996, 1996

3540613048 / 9783540613046

Series: Book 68 of 126 - Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

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Seller: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, GermanyBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

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This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989' and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973'. The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously. 188 pp. Englisch.…

Seller Inventory # 9783540613046

Title
Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information
Author
Wolfgang Ryll
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg Jul 1996
Publication year
1996
Condition
Neu
Binding
Taschenbuch
Language
English
ISBN 10
3540613048
ISBN 13
9783540613046
Item weight
295 grams
Dimensions
235x155x11 mm
Series
Book 68 of 126: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

Bergisch Gladbach, Germany

5-star seller

AbeBooks seller since January 11, 2012

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BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

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