Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information

Language: English

Published by Springer, J.B. Metzler Jul 1996, 1996

3540613048 / 9783540613046

Series: Book 68 of 126 - Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

  • Softcover
  • New
See all details

Seller: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germanybuchversandmimpf2000

5-star seller

AbeBooks seller since January 23, 2017

Softcover

Condition: New

US$ 61.41

US$ 66.88 shipping 
Ships from Germany to U.S.A.

Quantity: 1 available

Add to basket
Free 30-day returns

Item description from seller

This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 188 pp. Englisch.…

Seller Inventory # 9783540613046

Title
Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information
Author
Wolfgang Ryll
Publisher
Springer, J.B. Metzler Jul 1996
Publication year
1996
Condition
Neu
Binding
Taschenbuch
Language
English
ISBN 10
3540613048
ISBN 13
9783540613046
Item weight
295 grams
Dimensions
235x155x11 mm
Series
Book 68 of 126: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

buchversandmimpf2000

Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germany

5-star seller

AbeBooks seller since January 23, 2017

Shipping rates from Germany to U.S.A.

Item60 to 60 business days60 to 60 business days
First itemUS$ 66.88US$ 83.60
Delivery times are set by sellers and vary by carrier and location. Orders passing through Customs may face delays and buyers are responsible for any associated duties or fees. Sellers may contact you regarding additional charges to cover any increased costs to ship your items.

Payment methods

  • Visa
  • Mastercard
  • American Express
  • Apple Pay
  • Google Pay
  • Check
  • Paypal

Store description

Impressum Thorsten Retsch Buchversand Mimpf2000 Oberölschnitz 16 95517 Emtmannsberg Deutschland Telefon: 09209-2023188 Email: mimpf2000@online.de USt-ID-Nr.: DE 235096871 Wir führen gebrauchte Bücher aus allen Sparten der Literatur

Specialty

Modernes Antiquariat - Bücher von 1960 bis heute

Seller's business information

buchversandmimpf2000

Germany