Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox

Martin Pleitz

ISBN 10: 3957430348 / ISBN 13: 9783957430342

Published by Brill Mentis, Brill | Mentis Mär 2018, 2018

About this Item

Neuware - The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.

Seller Inventory # 9783957430342

Bibliographic Details

• Title: Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox
• Publisher: Brill Mentis, Brill | Mentis Mär 2018
• Publication Date: 2018
• Language: English
• ISBN 10: 3957430348
• ISBN 13: 9783957430342
• Binding: Taschenbuch
• Condition: Neu
• Dimensions: 233W x 154H x 40D millimeters 233 millimeters width by 154 millimeters height by 40 millimeters depth
• Weight: 958 grams

About this title

Synopsis

The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist - and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this -, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.