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This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.

Drew Fudenberg began his career at UC Berkeley, where he was tenured at the age of 28; he then taught at MIT, and moved to Harvard in 1993, where he is currently the Frederick E. Abbe Professor of Economics. Fudenberg is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, and a past member of its Council; he is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Science. Fudenberg was the editor of Econometrica from 1986 to 2000 and has served as associate editor for Games and Economic Behavior, the Journal of Economic Theory, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Theoretical Economics. He is the co-author of Dynamic Models of Oligopoly (with Jean Tirole), Game Theory (with Jean Tirole) and The Theory of Learning in Games (with David K. Levine). In addition to the work collected here, Fudenberg helped pioneer the use of modern game theoretic analysis in industrial organization, and the study of non-equilibrium learning. His current research interests include bounded rationality, contract theory, evolutionary game theory, non-equilibrium learning, and repeated games.

David K Levine is Professor of Economics at Washington University in St. Louis. He is co-editor of Econometrica, co-editor of NAJ Economics, President of the Society for Economic Dyamics, fellow of the Econometric Society, research associate of the NBER, member of the American Economic Association Honors and Awards Committee, and member of the Sloan Research Fellowship Program Committee. He has published extensively in professional journals, including The American Economic Review, Econometrica, The Review of Economic Studies, The Journal of Political Economy, The Journal of Economic Theory, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, and The American Political Science Review. He is the author of (list books here). Prof. Levine's ongoing research in general equilibrium theory focuses on growth theory, innovation, and intellectual property. His other main area of research interest is dynamic games. Currently, Prof. Levine is studying the endogenous formation of preferences and social norms. He was among the first to use quantitative theory to study experimental data, using a model of signalling of intentions to explain altruism and spite in games such as ultimatum bargaining and centipede.