Mañana in Cuba is a comprehensive analysis of contemporary Cuba with an incisive perspective of the Cuban frame of mind and its relevancy for Cuba's future. Part one of the book critically explores the mindset Cubans have developed living under a totalitarian system and introduces modern concepts of choice architecture and governance that can be employed Mañana in Cuba to foster a democratic civil society. Part two turns to a discussion of the principles that should guide sociopolitical and economic transition policies in line with Cuban culture and history. Mañana in Cuba offers a sophisticated analysis of the challenges and opportunities that will be present in post-Castro Cuba with an eye to intelligent, nuanced, and often "outside the box" solutions to aid business and government policymakers interested in Cuba's future. A unique aspect of this book is that it does not seek to unnaturally mend a decimated civil society, but rather, it offers policy approaches anchored on current Cuban ethos and society. This is a book about finding ways to facilitate the Cuban transition from totalitarianism and a centrally planned economy to liberal democracy and a free-market economic system. As the author argues, the alternative visions presented for Cuba's future matter because one of them will crystallize into the sociopolitical and economic narrative of the country for generations to come.

Maana in Cuba

The Legacy of Castroism and Transitional Challenges for CubaBy Jos Azel

AuthorHouse

Copyright © 2010 Jos Azel
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4490-7655-9

Contents

Foreword................................................................................xiiiAcknowledgments.........................................................................xviiIntroduction............................................................................xixChapter I - Cuba: Alternative Roads in an Uncertain Future..............................1Change in Cuba: How Citizens View Their Country's Future................................5No Revolution of Rising Expectations....................................................11Chapter II - Freedom from Fear..........................................................16The "China Model" Syndrome..............................................................19Economic Changes sans Political Changes: Where Do They Lead?............................22Chapter III - Search for Meaning........................................................28The Despot Within - Democracy Para Que? (What For?)....................................31"What's Past Is Prologue"...............................................................33Chapter IV - The First Law..............................................................38"Every Man Is Obliged to Overcome His Bitterness."......................................42"To Change Masters Is Not to Be Free"...................................................44Chapter V - No Le Pidas Peras Al Olmo (Do Not Ask Pears of the Elm).....................47Freedom and Liberty.....................................................................50Democracy...............................................................................53Liberalism and Liberal Democracy........................................................55Chapter VI - Carajo, Somos como Somos (We Are theWayWe Are).............................57The Cuban Post-Castro Interregnum.......................................................60The Logic of the Market.................................................................63Chapter VII - Cuban Informality and Choice Architecture.................................69Cuban Informality: Necessary or Contingent?.............................................71Nudging Cubans to Embrace Civic Values..................................................72Chapter VIII - The Pursuit of Happiness.................................................81Temporary Inexperience vs. Permanent Obstructionism.....................................86Part Two The Reform Process.............................................................91Chapter IX - Personnel Reforms..........................................................93Lustration..............................................................................96The Cuban Lustration Dilemma............................................................99Chapter X - Institutional Reforms.......................................................103Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias: A Farewell to Arms?....................................110The Elusive "Government of Laws, and Not of Men"........................................113Chapter XI- Political Reforms...........................................................119Prospect Theory and the Prospects for Reform............................................122The Bargaining and Compromise Stage.....................................................125The Early Elections Paradox.............................................................127Parliamentary versus Presidential Governments...........................................130A "Made In and For Cuba" Democratic Political System....................................134Chapter XII - Economic Reforms..........................................................137From the Bottom Up......................................................................141The General Argument: Gradualism or "Big Bang"..........................................144The First Big Steps.....................................................................146The "Dollarization" Option..............................................................149The Stimulation of Entrepreneurial Activity.............................................153Government Revenue Sources..............................................................157Nudging Foreign Direct Investments......................................................159El Silencio Otorga (Silence Grants Consent).............................................166

Chapter One

Cuba: Alternative Roads in an Uncertain Future

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I, I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference

Robert Frost

As the Castro brothers' era comes to an end, for Cubans two roads diverge in an uncertain future. Which one is taken, to paraphrase Robert Frost, will make all the difference. It is an obvious oversimplification to speak of Cuba's future in terms of only two possible paths. There are myriad generic as well as indigenous variations of political and economic systems that may be adopted (and adapted) by any given society. The dichotomy here into just two non-overlapping alternatives is meant to spotlight one path that places individual freedoms and empowerment front-and-center, and another path that does not. One is a governing philosophy that embraces an understanding of human rights and individual freedoms as essential to sustained development; the other advocates the primacy of economic measures, even if undertaken outside the framework of democratic empowerment. One road leads to the advocacy of policies for a rapid democratic transition and the strengthening of civil society and democratic institutions, and the other leads to an indefinite wait before democratic reforms can be instituted.

At the most basic level, two opposed systems of values are at play: one in which primacy goes to human rights, freedoms, and democracy; and one in which priority is given to financial prosperity and economic growth. Understanding the consequences and implications of these alternative paths matters because the path chosen will crystallize the Cuban post-Castro narrative for generations to come.

Cuba today can be described as an impossible country (un pas imposible), with unsustainable sociopolitical and economic arrangements. For the Cuban people, the experience of more than a half-century of living under a totalitarian regime, and under the constant bombardment of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, means a legacy of economic, social, political and civil backwardness. This is a continuing legacy of civil society unpreparedness not unlike the one the country faced after the colonial period. Cuba's dysfunctional heritage from a decadent Spain five centuries ago was a significant, perhaps dominant, factor in the post-colonial milieu of corruption and political confusion. Then, Madrid was Cuba's model of political behavior, "a sort of decrepit teacher still living in the past." From Spain's inept political elite, Cubans learned about "bureaucratic corruption, caudillismo (warlords), dogmatic intolerance, messianic leadership, a malformed judicial system and a deformed government administration," as well as militarism. These characteristics were evident during the first five decades of the Republic. As eminent Cuban historian and professor Jaime Suchlicki points out:

By the time of Chibs' death [in 1951], Cuba's political life was a sad spectacle ... Politics came to be regarded by the Cuban people with disrespect. To become a politician was to enter into an elite, a new class apart from the interest of the people. The elected politicians did not owe allegiances to their constituencies, not even to their nation, but only to themselves ... Political figures furthermore were the objects of popular mockery.

Today, the Castro brothers' decadent politico-economic system bequeaths Cubans the same inheritance of a civil society unprepared for the demands of a liberal democracy and a competitive market economy. Today, as in 1902, Cuba's unfortunate political heritage foretells of enormous difficulties in the years ahead. For many in Cuba, the political ideology they have been taught for fifty years represents their primary frame of reference.

Over seventy-three percent of the Cuban population was born in the revolutionary period after 1959. As a practical matter, only retirement-age Cubans can have any adult recollection of enjoying individual freedoms. Stated differently, no Cuban under the age of fifty has lived with a free press, free labor unions, or an independent judicial system or legislature; nor has he participated in pluralistic elections or in any way been exposed to the rights, privileges, and obligations of citizens in a pluralistic democratic system. In 1902, in his inauguration as Cuba's first president, Don Toms Estrada Palma is said to have noted, "We finally have a republic; now we need citizens." A great tragedy of the Cuban experience is that over a century after independence from Spain, post-Castro Cuba still faces the same paucity of responsible citizenship behavioral patterns.

But conceptually, the term "unprepared" masks a deeper, more pernicious, and fundamental characteristic of the Cuban sociopolitical psyche. That is a lack of appreciation, perhaps even contempt, for the vicissitudes of democratic institutions and governance. Hand-in-hand with this contempt for institutions goes a historical belief in violence as a legitimate means through which to achieve political objectives.

Notwithstanding the sad spectacle of its political life, at the time of Fidel Castro's revolution, Cuba enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in Latin America, with a growing, well-educated middle class. As it were, the generation of Cuban adults that welcomed Castro's ascension to power was the most democratically experienced generation in Cuba's history following the 1940 Constitution and the constitutionally freely elected presidents (1940-1952). No other Cuban generation before or since has had more exposure to democratic governance or institutions. And yet, this generation-Cuba's most prepared in terms of democratic values, consciousness and civil responsibilities-acquiesced overtly to the dismantling of due process and the rule of law.

In February 1959, just one month into the revolution, Fidel Castro transferred all legislative powers to his "Council of Ministers" in a blatant violation of the constitution he had vowed to uphold. Cubans applauded. When Jos Miro Cardona, a highly respected attorney serving as the provisional government's Prime Minister, resigned in protest, Cubans responded with a collective yawn. The following month, when a revolutionary tribunal acquitted a group of Batista's air force personnel of war crimes, Fidel Castro was infuriated by the acquittal and ordered a new trial, in which the accused were dutifully found guilty. Explaining his action, Castro stated that "revolutionary justice is based not on legal precepts but on moral convictions." As historian and attorney Pedro Roig points out, "If that was a valid premise, the question was then: whose moral convictions?" Once again, Cubans failed to protest the manifest trampling of due process and the rule of law.

These and many other early 1959 attacks on democratic values and institutions were not covert, marginal, or disputed controversial violations. They were an open and flagrant abandonment of core democratic institutional values and precepts. Each case was met with indifference and perhaps even complicity by the majority of Cubans. The tragic paradox is that throughout their history, Cubans have fought persistently and valiantly for independence, for social justice, and more abstractly for the Motherland. However, political rights and civil liberties, and just as critically their supporting institutions, have not ignited comparable patriotic fervor.

Sadly, the last five decades of totalitarian rule have further distanced the Cuban population from an understanding and robust appreciation for the role of democratic institutions and civil society. In the Cuban political mindset, messianic leadership trumps democratic institutions every time.

Change in Cuba: How Citizens View Their Country's Future

In 2008, Freedom House conducted in-depth interviews with a cross-section of Cuban citizens in five Cuban provinces. The research explored how citizens view their country's future. These interviews allow us a glimpse into the contemporary attitudes and mores of Cuban civil society. According to the Freedom House report, young Cubans, while particularly disillusioned, are mostly politically apathetic. For them, as for most Cubans, the emblematic response to government injustice is to complain and conform. This dreary attitude has developed over decades of government intimidation and indoctrination. One respondent further explained the cynicism and apathy as "cambiar para que todo siga igual" ("change so that everything stays the same"). A key research finding is that for Cubans on the island, the major concerns relate to bread-and-butter issues. "Outside of economic concerns, few respondents named political issues as cause for concern. Only artists and intellectuals were concerned with the lack of civil and political rights." This is not surprising, given Cuba's abysmal economic situation. But when asked what they would do if reforms do not take place within the next few years, the answer was "nothing." Interviewees also expressed that if they could no longer conform, they would seek to leave the country. Another significant finding of the Freedom House research is that although Cuban youth are the most disillusioned segment of the population, they are also apathetic to political issues and do not see themselves as capable of organizing a movement for change. Significantly, all but one of the respondents under age thirty expressed a desire to leave the country.

This political apathy, or perhaps capitulation, particularly within the dissatisfied youth, stands in sharp contrast with the historical political activism of Cuba's student movements, particularly from the 1930s to the early years of the revolution. If changing mores capture the fundamental values of society, it seems that conforming has taken root in Cuba's society. In Cuba, the psychological fight-or-flight stress response has been reformulated to conform-or-flight.

Based on the responses to questions regarding the activities of pro- democracy dissident groups, Cubans appear unwilling to participate. "When asked about the possibility of a public protest, many respondents were perplexed and did not know how to answer." Cubans today view action against the authorities as ineffective and dangerous, and discount the possibility that a popular response could lead to political change; rather, emigration is viewed as the ultimate form of protest, with quiet acceptance as the second option.

In terms of the future, the Freedom House report finds that Cubans perceive civil society as thin and irrelevant. They believe change can only take place from the top down-from within the Communist Party. To Cubans, change from the bottom up, originating with civil society, is inconceivable.

Also in 2008, a Cuban Public Opinion Survey was undertaken by The International Republican Institute (IRI). Personal face-to-face interviews employing a stratified-intercept methodology were conducted with Cuban adults in all fourteen Cuban provinces. For current purposes, one of the most telling questions was: "What do you think is the biggest problem in Cuba?" Aggregately, only 8.9 percent of the respondents cited "Lack of Freedoms/Political System" as the biggest problem. As in the Freedom House interviews, bread-and- butter issues dominated the concerns. For example, aggregately the main concerns for 56.9 percent of respondents were Low Salaries/High Cost of Living, together with the Double Currency Standard.

Other specified concerns were: Embargo/Isolation 8.5%, Food Scarcity 6.8 %, Health/Lack of Medicine 4.3 %, Poor Transportation Infrastructure 4.1%, Lack of or Dilapidated Housing 2.4%. The age distribution of the top three responses shows that the overwhelming concern with bread-and-butter issues over lack of freedoms is consistent across the age brackets.

Perhaps it is possible to explain this feeble concern with civil liberties and political rights in psychological Maslovian terms by noting that Cubans must dedicate an inordinately large portion of their daily lives to the tasks associated with meeting the most basic physiological needs. According to Maslow's "hierarchy of needs" thesis, higher-level needs only come into focus once the lower-level needs are met. If Cubans must dedicate most of their day to making ends meet (resolviendo, or resolving), they cannot, or so the argument goes, think about the more abstract, higher-level, "self-actualization" (in Maslow's terminology) needs. Some researchers, however, have found little evidence for the hierarchical structure of needs proposed by Maslow, and others note that fundamental human needs are non- hierarchical and are ontologically universal. That is, needs are invariant in nature and simply a condition of being human.

Clearly, when people's physical and mental energies are totally directed to daily survival, there is little left for less immediate needs. In a totalitarian state such as Cuba, daily survival includes avoiding arbitrary imprisonment or the loss of one's job. Preoccupation with basic survival needs is a force mitigating against political activism. But in the Cuban context, this theoretical construct does not explain apathy toward lack of civil liberties, particularly in the youth. As noted earlier, the current political apathy stands in sharp contrast to the historical political activism of Cuba's student movements and their struggle for the higher-level needs of truth and justice.

A mid-2006 Gallup poll conducted with six hundred Havana residents and four hundred Santiago residents showed that only one in four Cuban respondents (26 percent) were satisfied with their freedom to choose what to do with their lives-the lowest satisfaction figure in the Gallup database of more than one hundred countries, and much lower than the 79 percent satisfaction across urban centers in twenty Latin America countries. It seems that in Cuba today there is an intellectual disconnect between the very personal question regarding the freedom to choose what do to with one's life and the more abstract constructs of civil liberties, political rights, and the Communist system. Although Cubans may want more personal freedoms, the majority of respondents to the Gallup poll-having been born since 1959-appear to have internalized the socialist values of the regime. This internalization of socialist values is perhaps a better explanation for the contrast between the current political apathy and the historical political activism of Cuba's student movements and their idealistic struggles for truth and justice.

In some imperfect sense, this internalization of socialist values can be thought of as analogous to the psychological response sometimes seen in abducted hostages, where the victims become emotionally attached to their captors, a sort of collective Cuban "Stockholm syndrome." One psychological explanation of Stockholm syndrome is that of cognitive dissonance. In essence, people do not like feeling unhappy for extended periods. As captives, they would be constantly unhappy, unless they resolved the cognitive dissonance by learning to identify with their captors. Stockholm syndrome captives find ways of sympathizing with their captors by believing, for instance, that the captors may be showing them favor with small acts of kindness. Captives fail to recognize fully the self-serving nature of the captor's actions. The Cuban Communist system has for decades used mechanisms such as the "Tarjeta de Abastecimiento," a food ration card astutely and machiavellianly misnamed as a supply card, to profess the benevolence of the state in providing for the citizenry. The ration card is, of course, a camouflaged state control mechanism that promotes identification with, and dependence on, the state.

To frame and conceptualize this internalization of socialist values phenomenon, it is also helpful to sketch below some of the articles of the Cuban Penal Code used to suppress dissent. These are articles repugnant to our democratic principles, but codified in socialist law:

Article 144 defines the crime of desacato, or "disrespect" Articles 208 and 209 define the crime of asociacin ilcita, or "illicit association" Article 103 defines the crime of propaganda enemiga, or "enemy propaganda" Article 207 defines the crime of asociacin para delinquir, or "associating with others to commit crimes" Article 115 defines the crime of difusin de falsas informaciones contra la paz internacional, or "dissemination of false information against international peace" Article 143 defines the crime of resistencia o desobediencia, or "resistance or disobedience"

Articles 72-90 define the crime of peligrosidad, or "social dangerousness"

(Continues...)

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